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NAME: Michael James Molina 
TITLE OF THESIS: Resources, Radicals, and Reactionaries: The First Red Scare in 
Oklahoma, 1919-1920  
DIRECTOR OF THESIS: Dr. Kenny Brown, Ph.D. 
ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to identify and explore the major events of the 
First Red Scare in Oklahoma, and how the distinct resources contained in the state, 
namely coal and oil, defined its Red Scare experience. This work will also cover 
responses by the local government and populace to provide a broader understanding of 
this major event in Oklahoma history. After the First World War reactions against 
radicalism, labor movements, and social disturbances appeared in heightened form. These 
reactions manifested themselves as an outgrowth of paranoia and fear resulting in the 
detention, deportation, and arrest of thousands of individuals across the United States. 
From coast to coast, labor disputes, strikes, and anti-government sentiment were seen as 
tantamount to treason, prompting an overly harsh reaction by the public and government 
officials. Oklahoma remained no exception and meted out its own punitive reactions 
against suspected radicals. The coal and oil producing areas especially served as hubs of 
labor discontent and reaction and helped plunge the state deeper into the bowels of Red 
 iii 
Scare hysteria. After the state severely overreacted to labor disturbances in Oklahoma 
and the national government overplayed the threat of radicals across the country, the First 
Red Scare evaporated.  
This study traces the course the first Red Scare took in Oklahoma, the response by 
the local government, and the response by the local populace and media during the 
critical years of 1919-1920. To that end, special attention is paid to the town of 
Drumright and the coal mining regions in the state, as these areas were situated near the 
nexus of resource production for their respective areas. Newspapers from the time are 
consulted, including the Drumright Derrick, the McAlester News Capital, Durant Weekly 
News, the Daily Oklahoman, Tulsa World, Harlow's Weekly, and others. Primary sources 
include the papers of Governor JBA Robertson located at the Oklahoma Department of 
Libraries, papers, clippings and vertical files from the Oklahoma History Center, 
congressional representative files from the Carl Albert Center at OU, US House and 
Senate hearings, published autobiographies, manuscripts, nation-wide papers including 
the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, and elsewhere. 
 1 
Introduction 
 During the post-World War I era, the United States faced unprecedented 
challenges to its deep-rooted social and economic systems. Millions of Americans 
returned home after aiding in the defeat of Germany, only to find a lack of jobs, a 
dramatic increase in the cost of living with little increase in wages, a volatile streak of 
unionism that demanded improved working conditions, and changes to the social system 
with the coming of prohibition and women's right to vote. The period of the late teens and 
early 1920s represented an explosive period in history in which it seemed the very fabric 
of the nation was torn asunder by so-called radicals who wished to forge a new society 
based on egalitarian and socialist values. Disturbances soon arose, centered around the 
nation's key resources and industries. Control over the extraction of such resources, along 
with the benefits involved, preoccupied both labor and big business, resulting in fierce 
clashes that threatened to bring the economy of the United States to a standstill. The 
xenophobic tendencies of Americans, fostered by the vicious propaganda against the 
"Huns," carried over into the post-war era, when America required a new enemy on 
which to focus their fear. Immigrants, naturalized citizens, and labor unions received the 
brunt of this new paranoia. They became targets in numerous actions taken by federal and 
state governments aimed at weeding out radical elements in society.  
 US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer carried out raids in 1919 and early 1920, 
targeting communists, socialists, and elements of radical labor. Government agents would 
round up detainees, routinely deprive them of their rights, and prepare them for 
deportation. These moves were greeted with overwhelming popularity by the people of 
the US, who became caught up in an irrational fear and paranoia that later became known 
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as the First Red Scare (1919-1920). Declarations of martial law, calling out of national 
guard units, deportations, and paranoia-induced witch hunts became widespread across 
the country.  
 Oklahoma played a part in this event with a falsely alleged Bolshevist uprising in 
Drumright making headlines nationwide. The state routinely overreacted to events that in 
any other year would have been simple labor disputes. Since becoming a state, Oklahoma 
continually laid the foundations for the Red Scare mentality to thrive. The second chapter 
of this thesis explores this aspect, showing how the spread of poverty, control of 
resources, unfair labor practices from businesses, and labor unions played a part in 
shaping the state's First Red Scare experience. The third chapter also examines the final 
foundations laid as local authorities in eastern Oklahoma battled with outmatched labor 
unions for control over the state's resources. The forces of radical labor suffered a 
humiliating and severe defeat at the hands of officials, becoming crushed by the end of 
World War I.  The state along with the rest of the nation would become swept up in 
hysteria as control of resources played a central role in inspiring fear during the First Red 
Scare. The Drumright strike stood as one of the two major pillars of the event, as 
discussed in the fourth chapter. While exact details of the event remain disputed, the 
strike showed how faulty reporting and an over-zealous government and populace gave in 
to fear and overreacted to the event. Far from a Bolshevik conspiracy, national guard 
troops marched on the town only to find peaceful residents, little damage, and no 
fatalities from the so-called revolution. 
 Chapter five explores the final pillar of Oklahoma's Red Scare reactionism during 
the nationwide mining strike in 1919. Resources once again played the main role in 
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attracting disturbances, as the populace reacted harshly to the presence of foreign miners. 
The press categorized the strike as a Bolshevist inspired conspiracy and the governor 
called out the national guard to protect the coal fields. A government report later revealed 
that foreign miners were the most well-behaved and had no ties to communism. The 
botched handling of the strike demonstrated Oklahoma's willingness to give in to the 
rampant and illogical paranoia flourishing across the country.  
 The state shared much in common with the rest of America. Some differences in 
Oklahoma existed, however, centered primarily around the state's unique resources that 
included the coal mining and oil production industries. These distinct resources attracted 
large numbers of union workers who fought for improved wages and other concessions 
from operators, bringing about the wrath of the state government in some of the most 
dramatic events in Oklahoma history. In essence, the resources contained in the state 
defined its Red Scare experience. This thesis seeks to explore the event with this 
geographic idea in mind, one that preceding historians have not touched upon. 
Furthermore, most Oklahoma historians focus primarily on the years 1907-1918, 
exploring either tenant farming or socialist and labor activity. Few dedicate the bulk of 
their research on the First Red Scare, a goal this work seeks to rectify by providing a 
more comprehensive study. Essentially, this work will demonstrate that the resource 
producing areas, such as Coal and Oil in Oklahoma, exacerbated the Red Scare fear 
against radicals, defining the state's experience. This thesis will also provide an 
unprecedented in-depth look at the event, with greater attention paid to events such as the 
Drumright riot that have long been overlooked by historians. To that end, this work's 
most important contribution to the existing literature remains the chapter on the strike in 
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Drumright in 1919, as no other work has delved as deep or as comprehensively into the 
event.  Another major contribution involves the complete picture of the First Red Scare 
this work provides. To date, no historian has covered the events of the entire First Red 
Scare in Oklahoma, a problem this thesis aims to rectify. The following pages expand on 
the literature by providing an in-depth look at this often neglected topic. It demonstrates 
how resources defined the state's experience during this time, and shows how countless 
Oklahomans became swept up in the nationwide frenzy and paranoia of the First Red 
Scare. 
 5 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 Over the last 90 years, various historians explained and evaluated the First Red 
Scare with differing levels of interpretation. Coverage from the academic community on 
the national level remains plentiful, with evolving critiques and explanations for why the 
event occurred. Beginning with Robert K. Murray's pioneering work in the 1950s, to the 
expanding themes of Kim Nielson in the 2000s, the wealth of literature and commentary 
on the topic has provided researches with a veritable treasure trove of interpretations, 
each one building off previous works. The historiography of the First Red Scare in 
Oklahoma remains a far different story. Most historians tend to focus on the agrarian and 
socialist movements of the state, and provide little coverage of the First Red Scare during 
this time period. This work will rectify this imbalance, and provide a thorough addition to 
the scarce literature on the topic in the state. It will also introduce the geographic element 
of resources, and how it played a key role in defining Oklahoma's Red Scare experience. 
 One of the first and most notable historians on the subject remains Robert K. 
Murray and his influential work Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920. 
First published in 1955, Murray wrote at a time when McCarthyism was in full swing and 
fear of communism highly unpopular to criticize. In the book, he said that the First Red 
Scare served as an example of how easily excessive hate and intolerance could spread 
within a democratic nation, when fear and suspicion supplanted reason.
1
 Murray 
explained that his reason for writing the book was to offer a full-length analysis of the 
Red Scare, of which he concluded was caused by wartime intolerance, postwar industrial 
unrest, the lack of statesman-like leadership, and an ill-fated quest for false normalcy. He 
also gave credit to the population for a fearful mentality, who apprehensively dreaded the 
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spread of the "Red Scourge" across the world.
2
 Essentially, Murray's interpretation of the 
Red Scare as an overreaction fueled by intolerance, unrest, and paranoia became the 
standard among historians. 
 In 1978, Robert Goldstein challenged this viewpoint in his work Political 
Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present. He claimed that past 
historians were incorrect in downplaying the radical labor threat, essentially painting the 
First Red Scare as an irrational manifestation of general fears and tensions in American 
society. He concluded that, by downplaying this radical threat, often to point out the valid 
excesses of the period, most historians obscured the fact that there was a large upsurge in 
radicalism both within and outside the labor movement in 1919. To prove this, Goldstein 
cited that radicals within the American labor movement as a whole were making strong 
gains and proposing challenges to the very structure of American capitalism. Seen from 
this viewpoint, the author argued that the First Red Scare reaction was a rational response 
on the part of government and business elites who perceived the status quo as being 
threatened. Thus, the effect of the paranoia was to destroy these developing forces of 
radicalism, and when the destruction was substantially achieved, the panic ended.
3
 
Throughout the section on 1919-1920, Goldstein introduces the hefty gains made by 
labor movements and the need for a conservative response. He claimed that a measure of 
fear of radicalism had become engrained in the American psyche, prompting them to 
demanded action. The Red Scare effectively put an end to threats from socialists, radical 
labor, and communism, and in comparison to the brutal and similar repression in Czarist 





 By 2000 Regin Schmidt also challenged the early literature on the subject when 
he published Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 
1919-1943. In the book he explores the connection of the FBI to the First Red Scare, and 
claimed that the institution entrenched itself in a political role during this time period. He 
builds on Murray's work, whom he cites as claiming that the Red Scare "made" the FBI 
and put it on the road to becoming the famous organization that it is today.
5
 Schmidt, 
however, challenged the early literature on the topic, saying that the existing explanation 
that the event was caused by an irrational, mass-based hysteria deserves questioning. He 
refuted Murray, who compared the event to McCarthyism and attributed it to a bottom 
up, grassroots support for the drastic actions taken. This "consensus" school of thought 
dominated American historical thinking during the 1950s and 60s, and assumed that 
events and polices were supported by a consensus of Americans.
6
  
 Schmidt denied this, and instead stated that powerful economic and conservative 
groups exploited the already existing social conflicts, as the First Red Scare gave them an 
opportunity to promote their anti-radical campaigns for their own benefit. The author 
agreed with Goldstein's brief treatment of the topic where he mentioned government and 
business elites used the event to crush their opposition. Schmidt stated that these elitist 
interest groups served as the primary causes of anticommunist policies, and had a real 
reason to want to see an end to organized labor's influence. To that end, they helped 
initiate a propaganda campaign to discredit unions as subversive, Bolshevist, and alien to 
American values. Furthermore, the government knew of this campaign, and even utilized 
private detective agencies as labor spies to exaggerate the revolutionary threat posed by 
radicalism to frighten employers. The press too engaged in such practices to keep its 
 8 
readership from its war-time highs when it reported on sensationalist stories. Schmidt 
concluded that the First Red Scare was an integrated part of a reactionary political 
campaign, created by businesses and their conservative allies aimed at destroying the 
power of organized labor and halt the growing government regulation of the economy.
7
 
The author certainly presents an arguable case for this, though he ignores important 
evidence in dismissing the mass hysteria aspect. Countless letters to legislators and 
actions by individuals and groups proved that citizens approved of the measures and even 
encouraged more action on the part of the government. The public truly feared 
Bolshevism, and to discount such influence in creating policy appears to dismiss the 
voluminous amounts of evidence to the contrary.  
 Diverging viewpoints continued to emerge, and in 2000, Kim E. Nielson 
published Un-American Womanhood: Antiradicalism, Antifeminism, and the First Red 
Scare. In this work, Nielson argued that gender was a primary component of Red Scare 
antiradicalism. Antifeminists during 1919-1920 saw radicalism as entangled in a web of 
economic, gender, sexual, and racial chaos, and successfully imbued much of the Red 
Scare sentiment with this belief.
8
 The author completely rebuffed the idea that gender 
played no relevant role in the First Red Scare as many historians argued, and that because 
of this the phenomenon deserves a closer look. She claimed that antifeminists embraced 
the fear, and their political fervor helped sustain antiradicalism throughout the 1920s. 
From this viewpoint, the Red Scare did not end in 1920, instead continuing throughout 
the decade as conservative women attacked the work of progressives. These antifeminists 
were driven by a fear of gender, sexual, and political disorder that compelled them to lead 
activist lives. Nielson maintained that these women used the anxieties surrounding 
 9 
Bolshevism, expansion of the state, social welfare programs, and peace efforts, to foster a 
political culture hostile to progressive female activists.
9
 She concluded that gender 
remained at the core of how the United States lives, discusses patriotism, proper 
citizenship, and the needs of the nation.
10
 Her work represents a fresh wave of discussion 
on the topic, as new historians incorporate gender and other elements into the discussion. 
Far from being quiet and staying at home, countless women did take part in the national 
events during the First Red Scare, and this book provides a glimpse into one faction that 
the author stated had a sizable impact on the propagation of fear during the period. 
 By the 2000's, an increasing number of historians continued to incorporate 
different elements into Red Scare historiography. A more recent publication from 2003, 
Rethinking the Red Scare: The Lusk Committee and New York's Crusade Against 
Radicalism, 1919-1923, by Todd Pfannestiel, postulates that as events unfolded, 
repression became more focused, with education a key target. As targets changed, 
methods of repression also shifted from raids and arrests to subtle legal and legislative 
proceedings. Finally, Pfannestiel claimed that the Red Scare did not end in January 1920, 
but advanced until 1923, when shifting perceptions on civil liberties brought the event to 
its conclusion.
11
 The author's work contributes another aspect overlooked by many, by 
introducing how authorities specifically targeted education to weed out undesirables. He 
disagreed with Schmidt, opting to go along with Murray's and a host of other historian's 
explanation that the First Red Scare involved a genuine panic from the public as the 
number of social issues came to a head after the war.
12
 
 Scientific racism, immigration, and anarchist movements would next be touched 
upon in the ever expanding approaches to the First Red Scare when Kenyon Zimmer 
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produced his doctoral dissertation over the subject in 2010. Zimmer focused on the topic 
in the United States covering the years 1885-1940. In his chapter over the First Red Scare 
period, he portrayed the activities of various Jewish, Italian, Russian, and other anarchist 
groups, and concluded that  congress, during and after World War I, was motivated by a 
combination of nativism, scientific racism, and antiradicalism which signaled the death 
knell of anarchist movements by limiting immigration of Southern and Eastern 
Europeans. This struck at the very heart of the domestic anarchist movement, migration 
and working-class mobility, which caused the eventual withering away of immigrant 
anarchism.
13
 Zimmer added to the historical debate by including specifically immigrant 
populations and their contributions to radical movements of the period. He agreed with 
Goldstein in stating that the gains by radicals motivated the government to take a action, 
eliminating the group as a threat. Interpretations of the First Red Scare have evolved from 
Murray's first publication to include a multitude of angles and incorporate a number of 
disciplines.  
 As the national historiography evolved, so too did interpretations of Oklahoma 
during the First Red Scare. One of the first major historians to touch upon the paranoia 
and fear during the time period in Oklahoma remains Angie Debo. Publishing Tulsa: 
From Creek Town to Oil Capital in 1943, she mentioned the radical Industrial Workers 
of the World (IWW) and vigilante actions taken by the ultra-nationalist Knights of 
Liberty in 1917. She explained that the war "increased the city's tumultuous spirit," and 
one midnight a group of Knights took members of the IWW from police custody to the 
edge of town, whipped, tarred, and feathered them, and ordered them to leave town. 
While she did not provide a value judgment on the action, her excerpt provides a valuable 
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early glimpse into a key resource producing area of the state and the growing fear that 
characterized much of the First Red Scare.
14
 
 Arrell Gibson painted a broader, yet still small picture of the events when he 
wrote Oklahoma: A History of Five Centuries in 1965. In the over 300 page work, 
Gibson utilized a scant paragraph in reviewing the chaotic events during Governor 
Robertson's administration. He merely mentioned the strike in McAlester, blamed by 
business interests on IWW agitation, and how it forced the governor to call out the 
national guard to Henreyetta, Coalgate, and McAlester. He later mentioned the 
declaration of martial law, and ended by stating that labor protests spread to railroads, 
building trades, and manufacturing plants. A brief portion focused on naming restrictive 
laws passed during this time, including criminal syndicalism legislation, the forbidding of 
flag desecration, and banning the teaching of foreign languages.
15
 While small in scope, 
this work laid the groundwork for interpretations on the First Red Scare, providing 
evidence of the event's impact on the state for a broad audience.  
 By the 1970s, scholars would take a keener interest in the subject, increasing the 
depth of their research about the early years of the state. To that end, most focused solely 
on the socialist movement, and while not delving too deeply into events of the First Red 
Scare, provided important details about the foundations of fear that carried over into 
1919-1920. Publishing in 1976, Garin Burbank wrote When Farmers Voted Red: The 
Gospel of Socialism in the Oklahoma Countryside, 1910-1924 in an effort to explain the 
unique aspects of Oklahoma Socialism. Burbank specifically cited in his book that he 
came from a Marxist background, learning from British social historians, and analyzed 




 Burbank appeared dismissive throughout his book of the Socialist Party, and 
stated that socialism was merely a transitory moment in the lives of tenant farmers, 
representing a brief period in time when people in squalid conditions responded to a 
radical doctrine of hopes and dreams.
17
 The author first described the social setting, 
laying out the desperate conditions of the people living in the state. Afterwards, he 
chronicled the development of the party through its rise and fall, and ends with a 
discussion on how the group failed in Oklahoma, and its impact. Among his conclusions 
were that the Socialists in Oklahoma were not true party adherents, as they vacillated 
between varying degrees of intensity.
18
 In covering the events of the First Red Scare, he 
provided little information regarding specific events, such as actions at Drumright or 
McAlester. Instead, he devoted time to speaking of the decline the post-war era caused 
upon the Socialist Party, stating that the failed Green Corn Rebellion and Red scare 
caused former supporters to fear for their safety.
19
 In the end, he stated that both 
repression and prosperity ended up killing the Socialist Party.
 20
 His work represented a 
major achievement in the exploration of the leftist party in the state, with countless 
scholars owing their own work to his original book.  
 One of the first to build off Burbank was James Green, who produced his seminal 
work on the subject in 1978, titled Grass-Roots Socialism: Radical Movements in the 
Southwest 1895-1943. Green expanded the overview to include Oklahoma, Texas, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana, and said that previous histories had focused primarily on the 
decline of Socialism in the US. His study, however, explains not only the disasters, but 
carries the story through to the 1930s and focuses not on its decline, but on its growth in 
the years prior to World War I. Specifically, he focused on the relationship between 
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populism and socialism, a relationship he saw as ignored in previous accounts.
21
 He 
illustrated the spirit of the southwestern socialist movement, describing it as one of 
combined anger and optimism, motivated by feelings of both hate and hope. As he put it, 
the Socialists "were terribly angry with the 'parasites' who denied the 'producers' the full 
reward for their honest toil,' but they were also amazingly hopeful about the possibility of 
creating a new society in their own lifetimes.'"
22
 Green defined the first Red Scare as 
occurring in the fall of 1917, with severe action taken against the IWW and other radical 
labor movements, eventually leading to the destruction of the Socialist party in eastern 
Oklahoma.
 23
 In a later section exclusively titled "Red Scare," the author spent four pages 
discussing the events of 1919 to early 1920. Briefly addressing the coal strike, he 
mentioned how the governor of Oklahoma declared martial law and acted decisively 
against all unions, especially those with radical members. He discussed the red flag ban, 
as well as the criminal syndicalism laws, aimed primarily at the IWW. Green did include 
in his book a mention of the telephone workers' strike in Drumright, explaining the 
details of Robertson sending in the national guard against "radical oil workers," who, as 
the author stated, had reportedly disarmed the sheriff and mayor and threatened them 
with lynching.
24
 This inclusion of expanded information on Drumright, while brief, 
portrayed an early interpretation of the event that would stand unchallenged for several 
decades. Together with Burbank, Green's work would stand as the second of two pillars 
in the history of socialism in the state, though still the gap remained in discussing with 
great detail the First Red Scare in Oklahoma. 
 By the 1982, James Scales and Danney Goble published their influential work, 
Oklahoma Politics: A History. This book covered the political history of the state from 
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territory days through the 1970s, and provided a comprehensive look at the rise and fall 
of political factions, governors, and issues facing the state. The two dedicated their book 
to Angie Debo, whom they called Oklahoma's greatest historian, and who brought the 
two together on the project. The book spends several pages discussing the fear building 
during World War I leading into the First Red Scare, portraying instances such as the 
Green Corn Rebellion and Tulsa Outrage in disparaging tones, making note of the 
overreaction of vigilantes in dealing with the IWW. Governor Robertson's actions during 
the First Red Scare in 1919 comprise around a one-and-a-half pages, with the authors 
stating surprisingly little about the Drumright telephone operator's strike. The book 
simply stated that the governor detected the hand of the IWW in the strike, and so called 
out the National Guard to allay the fear of the townspeople.
25
  
 Scales earlier wrote of the strike in his 1949 PhD dissertation, providing arguably 
the first historical work on the subject. This would later form the basis for his partnership 
with Goble in writing Oklahoma Politics. The information in the thesis provided much 
the same information, stating that purported actions of the IWW provoked Robertson to 
act. Similarly, in his dissertation he showed important details of the strike, and offered a 
negative commentary on the governor stating that he showed "debatable judgment" in his 
handling of the situation.
26
 In their later book, Scales and Goble maintained that 
Robertson used heavy-handed repressive legislation and military powers in an effort to 
steer the Democratic party away from radicalism. They devoted half a paragraph to the 
coal mining strike, and spend the next chapter discussing the political landscape of 
Oklahoma during the 1920s, presenting little else on the First Red Scare.
27
 While brief, 
their inclusion of events during the Red Scare, as well as admitting that the governor 
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overreacted to events, provided a clear historical interpretation of the event. While going 
along with the mainstream national historiography dating back to Murray, that told of the 
event as a paranoid induced reaction, Scales ad Goble still provided an early history of 
the event in Oklahoma. 
 In 1986, John Thompson penned the next important work discussing radicalism in 
the state with Closing the Frontier: Radical Response in Oklahoma, 1889-1923. In his 
work, the author argued that Oklahomans who loathed capitalism but lacked political 
awareness and more thoughtful radicals worked together to gain control of the political 
system before corporate powers could become entrenched. Similarly, he stated that the 
northern and western prairie outgrew its frontier status eclipsing the southern and eastern 
portions of the state developmentally. He concluded that in the south and east an 
especially violent, "almost primitive" radicalism grew beside a modest yet dignified 
Socialist ideology.
28
 Thompson appeared to be the first historian to address major 
geographic themes in his publication, as he addresses the disparity between regions 
giving rise to different forms of radical activity. He maintained that Oklahomans' political 
ideologies came from a legacy of cultures and socioeconomic systems introduced to the 
wilderness and altered by the frontier, and that one needed to give nature credit. He 
maintained that the effects of formidable natural forces, especially the weather, had the 
power to dwarf the influence of established cultural and economic practices.  
 He eventually concluded that the frontier period of Oklahoma included a number 
of paradoxes, involving communalism and individualism, materialism and idealism, 
tolerance and bigotry, cosmopolitanism and provincialism, and humanitarianism and 
violence in both advancing and destroying political radicalism.
29
 Thompson later 
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explained that the Green Corn Rebellion and political repression after the war illustrated 
a tragic phenomenon. Essentially, as the state matured, pressure to conform increased, 
and local leaders along with ambitious farmers and workers feared Oklahoma's radical 
reputation would hinder investment and prevent the state from "outgrowing its 'colonial 
status."
30
 Thompson attempted to rebuff the dismissive attitudes towards Oklahoma 
socialism espoused by Burbank and Green. Rather than a simple "transitory moment," he 
claimed "the fact that the populists, the socialists and the neopopulists were crushed, 
dispersed, and, for the most part, forgotten should not, however, tarnish the memory of 
their brief battle."
31
 Essentially, Thompson offered a far more positive outlook on the 
movement, and while spending but a little time on the early Red Scare, he outlined his 
argument on how the frontier and the geographic environment helped shape the leftist 
movements.  
 Thompson specifically set himself in open disagreement with Burbank and Green, 
dismissing their claims about the lack of authenticity among Oklahoma socialists. While 
covering little over the First Red Scare, the author cements himself as an opponent of the 
two major interpreters of Oklahoma socialism. 
 This growing trend of inclusion and reinterpretation continued with Steve Sewell, 
who in 1997 published arguably the most complete account of the coal mining strike in 
Oklahoma up to that time. His article, entitled "Painted Red: The Coal Strike of 1919," 
provided a comprehensive look on the overreaction of Governor Robertson to the strike, 
and detailed the history, motivations, and outcomes for the major parties involved. Sewell 
held that the coal miners, who maintained legitimate demands, became swept up in the 
broad-brush assault on the nation's radicals. He concluded that "the nation was so 
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consumed by the paranoia associated with the Red Scare that a strike over wage rates 
frozen for two years became an attempt to topple the government in the eyes of many 
officials." He called Robertson's actions heavy-handed and ill conceived, and stated that 
the governor was hardly alone in his belief in a Bolshevik conspiracy.
32
 Sewell skillfully 
portrayed the events in light of the rampant hysteria of the time, and produced the 
definitive work on the subject. The author agreed with the majority of historians on the 
First Red Scare about the overreaction on the government's part, so the interpretation 
remains nothing new. However, by his inclusion of the Oklahoma aspect to the 
nationwide coal strike, a topic never covered in such depth before, he provides a strong 
and detailed account of the First Red Scare in the state. 
 By the 1990s, new historians examined a greater array of topics from Oklahoma 
during this time period. One of these, Nigel Sellars, provided the most extensive research 
on Wobblies in Oklahoma ever to come out. In his 1998 publication, Oil, Wheat, & 
Wobblies: The Industrial Workers of the World in Oklahoma, 1905-1930, he decried 
mainstream historians and their neglect of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW; 
Wobblies) in the state. He maintained that the IWW’s presence in the Oklahoma oil fields 
led directly to the massive state and federal efforts to prosecute and break the union 
completely, which was a central event in the IWW’s history. He also sought to place the 
otherwise nameless rank and file Wobblies and their activities at the center of events. He 
stated that “although previous studies have focused on more colorful and highly 
publicized events such as mass strikes, free-speech fights, and high-profile trials, 
Wobblies were rarely made at such levels. They were made in the harvest fields and the 
pipeline camps and their fates were determined not in federal conspiracy trials but by 
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 The book devotes extensive time to the destruction of the radical organization 
during the First Red Scare, especially during the years 1918-20. Sellers primarily focused 
on the legal methods utilized by the government, armed with the criminal syndicalism 
laws, to indict the beleaguered union members. He provided several sentences on the 
Drumright affair, which he implicitly called an overreaction on the governor's part. He 
concluded that Robertson had falsely implicated the IWW, and upon sending in the 
national guard, found the town quiet. There is some confusion when he stated that the 
police arrested eighteen persons on charges of riot but later dropped the cases.
34
 One 
individual, Ed Welch, was actually brought to trial and found guilty of inciting riot, 
though he denied membership in the IWW. Sellars also mentioned the McAlester strike, 
again attributing it to overreaction from the governor who based his information on false 
reports.
35
 While brief, the author offers his own conclusions about the two events rather 
than stating them as a matter-of-fact, and provides an alternative viewpoint to two 
instances glossed over by most historians. He also placed himself squarely against Green 
and Burbank, who gave little credence to the effect of radicals in Oklahoma. Whereas 
they argued that such organizations in Oklahoma were either deficient, transitory, or had 
little impact nationwide, Sellars maintained that the defeat of the IWW in Oklahoma was 
a major event that went a long way towards ending the movement nationwide. Sellars 
stood among the growing number of historians who refuted Burbank and Green, and offer 
alternative looks at the different aspects of Oklahoma during the early 1900s.   
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 By 1999, the tide appeared to turn further against Green and Burbank. Jim Bissett 
similarly lent his voice to this growing cacophony when he published Agrarian Socialism 
in America: Marx, Jefferson, and Jesus in the Oklahoma Countryside 1904-1920. At the 
outset, the author attempted to distance himself from Green, Burbank, and even 
Thompson. While mentioning his indebtedness to them for their scholarly work, he 
argued that categorizing the socialist movement in Oklahoma as fatally flawed and less 
legitimate was a mistake. He maintained that Burbank teetered close to outright distrust 
of the movement, as he called into question its own validity. He cited that Green provided 
a less disparaging interpretation of the leftist movement, but nonetheless held that 
Oklahoma socialists were only successful because they were "such good pupils" from 
outside experts and "real Socialists."
36
  Bissett claimed the crucial difference between his 
work and those before him lay in the idea that socialists were no less legitimate than 
those from other states, and did not need to remake themselves into the party image from 
Milwaukee or New York. Instead the author attempted to show the unique qualities of 
Oklahoma that enabled citizens to mount an organized, effective movement to further the 
socialist cause, drawing on a critical mass of talented social activists who understood how 
to win political battles37 He ended his pronouncement by stating that the root of these 
false claims about Oklahoma lay in a "thinly veiled anti-agrarian bias."
38
  
 Bissett's treatment of the events leading up to the First Red Scare appeared 
thorough, with ample time given to the buildup of the IWW, the Green Corn Rebellion, 
Unions, and the anti-radicalism that spread into Oklahoma. Unfortunately, he made no 
mention of the actual events in places such as Drumright and McAlester, or of Governor 
Robertson's harsh reactions. Throughout his book he did provide a balanced and even 
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favorable viewpoint of leftist movements without the condescending attitudes of previous 
historians. Still, the book's focus did not cover the events, and for the time being Sewell's 
work would stand as the only major publication on events during the First Red Scare in 
Oklahoma. 
 In 2002, a major scholarly work went back to the agrarian side of Oklahoma when 
Kurt Lively wrote his PhD dissertation on a history of farm tenancy in Oklahoma from 
1890-1950. He said that the story of Oklahoma farm tenancy remained largely untold, 
and concluded that the practice ultimately succumbed to an increasingly entrepreneurial 
world by the 1940s.
39
 Lively held that tenant farmers in Oklahoma exerted greater 
influence on policy than those in southern states, especially through the Socialist Party, of 
which the author held was more influential than in any other state. He maintained that the 
alliance between labor and farmers, created to combat similar perceived enemies, faltered 
as the two groups were too different. Essentially, labor wished to reform capitalism, 
while farmers desired to harness it and gain a larger share of wealth.
40
 The author 
discussed the failure of Socialism in the World War I period, stating that its opposition to 
the war, coupled with the general prosperity and rising commodity prices undermined 
their platform, effectively making it unpopular to be a member in the party.
41
 The thesis 
offers valuable commentary on one of the groups most prone to leftist and radical activity 
and provides a thorough history of its existence. Lively maintains a viewpoint on the Red 
Scare similar to mainstream historians, and while not devoting much time to the event, he 
does provide a thorough analysis of tenant farming, building on Green and Burbank's 
earlier work. 
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 In the 21st century, new historians continually incorporated different aspects into 
Oklahoma history with increasing frequency. Topics such as gender, feminism, race, and 
other issues previously ignored appeared on the forefront of early 1900s Oklahoma 
historiography. In 2004, Bonnie Lynn-Sherow exemplified this when she wrote Red 
Earth: Race and Agriculture in Oklahoma Territory. This work expanded on the 
territorial studies done on Oklahoma before it became a state. She included in her book 
the important contributions of geography, specifically the environmental and cultural 
transformation that transformed the state.
42
 She examined three county settlements as 
case studies in the territory's ecological and social development, and provided answers to 
several questions: how different peoples changed the landscape, how the simplification of 
the agricultural economy affected the human population, and who benefited or suffered 
from the mythology of opportunity.
43
 Her inclusion of geographic elements amidst the 
racial makeup, and how this altered the ecological and agricultural landscape provided a 
unique look at Oklahoma's pre-state history, showing that historians could incorporate a 
greater breadth of interdisciplinary methods than previously used. While noting nothing 
on the Red Scare, her inclusion of different themes demonstrated the changing face of 
historiography of the state, and how historians increasingly used these themes. 
 That same year in 2004, Suzanne Schrems published another unique look at the 
different aspects of the state with Who's Rocking the Cradle? Women Pioneers of 
Oklahoma Politics From Socialism to the KKK, 1900-1930. Only four years after 
Nielson's work on anti-feminists, Schrems provided a counterbalance by exploring the 
role of radical feminists during this volatile period in Oklahoma history. Her main goal in 
writing was to add to the historiography of women in politics, including conservative 
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women in the discussion of women's political culture in the early twentieth century. She 
also stated that discussing roots of women's political philosophy aids in understanding 
many positions that divide women in the current day.
44
 Throughout the book, she 
portrayed activist women that helped spread the gospel of socialism. Through their 
efforts, women on the left organized and became an important force in supporting issues 
including the right to vote, fighting against corruption, and improve conditions of men, 
women, and children within the state. She characterized the First Red Scare period as one 
that introduced instability and worry, especially among the political parties that saw the 
1920 election up for grabs. This encouraged the parties to actively court women, who 
now had the right to vote, and who had a new opportunity to contribute to the political 
process.
45
 The author claimed that as men positioned their parties along conservative 
lines in reaction to reform legislation, women continued to champion progressive ideals 
that remained unpopular in the political climate of the First Red Scare.
46
 Schrems' covers 
little in the way of major events during the First Red Scare, instead focusing on the 
election of 1920 and how women mobilized to effect change through the electoral 
process. Her work on gender history and feminism during the time period provided a 
solid illustration of how historians had evolved to include a broader range of concepts, 
and how that evolution impacted Oklahoma historians as well. 
 Overall, the general feeling among historians towards the First Red Scare tended 
to state that the war heightened anti-radical sentiment among the population, with 
socialists and unions being lumped together in with the dangerous element of society. 
Wherever a labor dispute or act against the government occurred, authorities labeled it a 
revolt against the state and linked it to Bolshevik influences. The first major 
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interpretation on the national level came from Robert Murray, whose ideas on how the 
US overreacted to a panic in a misguided attempt to refocus its war-time patriotism and 
paranoia remained the cornerstone of Red Scare interpretation for decades. Slowly, 
historians challenged this viewpoint, with some claiming that businesses and elite 
interests manufactured the event to rid themselves of radical problems, and that the 
populace held no direct involvement or effect on the process. Murray's work, while the 
oldest, remains the most reliable interpretation of Red Scare events. While others are 
correct to include other disciplines and viewpoints to the scholarship, the discounting of 
the genuine popular support and encouragement of the Red Scare seems misplaced. 
Despite business and government clearly wishing to crush their opponents in labor, 
laying the blame solely on those entities as prime movers in the crisis is an 
oversimplification. From research gathered during this project, the population 
dramatically supported and encouraged harsh action, even suggesting harsher action than 
what the government already carried out. Thus, Murray's book remains a strong 
foundation for Red Scare scholarship, but future researchers that exclude important 
elements, laying blame definitively on one group should remain cautious. As the 
historiography evolved however, so too did the topics covered, from gender history to 
geography.  
 The same could be said of Oklahoma historiography. The two primary 
interpretations came from Burbank and Green, though they offered little in the way of 
Red Scare commentary. Most historians primarily wrote of Oklahoma during the period 
in terms of the socialist movement and its agrarian aspects. This changed slightly with 
Sewell, who wrote a major account of the state during the crisis, though little has been 
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done before or since. Sewell's article remains a key interpretation of the Red Scare in 
Oklahoma, at last giving credence a portion of the event that many ignored for too long. 
The scope of research, similar to the national historians, has come to include gender, 
geography, Marxism, and a whole host of previously neglected viewpoints, serving to 
enrich the material on the era. Despite this, no single work has touched upon the First 
Red Scare in Oklahoma with attention to detail, and this work seeks to fill that void. The 
following chapters will cover the foundations laid that gave rise to the Red Scare 
mentality, as well as the major events of 1919-1920. The Drumright strike and later the 
coal strike serve as the major chapters of the First Red Scare in Oklahoma, and will show, 
along with the rest of the work, that the main impetus behind the radical activity lay in 
the resources possessed by the state. The labor activity within Oklahoma centered around 
the major industries of coal mining and oil production, allowing for a wholly unique Red 
Scare experience, different from other states in the union. By the end, this study will 
provide an in-depth look into the major occurrences that made up the First Red Scare in 
Oklahoma, linking events to resources, and finally fill in a chapter of Oklahoma's history 
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Chapter 2: Oklahoma and the Nation, 1907-1919 
 Resources played a key role in shaping politics and popular opinion on a host of 
issues since the state's inception, with agriculture forming the backbone of early labor 
disputes. The First Red Scare would greatly magnify hostilities over resources, striking 
hard in the mining and oil producing regions. The unrest that contributed to the event had 
early beginnings in Oklahoma history however, with foundations laid during its formative 
years. Disputes emerged as tenant farmers numbering in the thousands relocated to the 
state. By 1910, these landless farmers outnumbered landed farmers for the first time. 
Tenants did not own the land they worked on, and remained enslaved to the whims of 
owners who forced many to raise cotton, a commodity suffering from low prices in the 
South.
1
 This struggle over control of resources and who would reap the benefits played 
into increasing tensions between owners and producers, cementing the struggle that 
would epitomize much of the First Red Scare. This harsh economic reality attracted a 
strong network of Socialist Party representatives to the state, with many farmers turning 
to the organization in desperation. Political leaders could only react with alarm at the 
growing popularity of the leftist movement. By 1917, coupled with national and state 
events, the World War I induced hyper-patriotism and growing fear of communist 
expansion provided politicians and wary citizens with a weapon to finally dismantle the 
anti-war Socialist Party in Oklahoma. Socialist aims for land reform and better control of 
resources were at once halted. These events directly laid the foundations for the First Red 
Scare, introducing a dark legacy of fear and repression that continued well into 1920. 
 Hearing of the dire conditions in the state, champions of the socialist cause 
quickly appeared on the landscape. They first arrived in the state in 1901, fielding 
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candidates for political office in the territory. They gradually increased their electoral 
success by producing a strong outreach program tailored to the needs of Oklahomans.
2
 
By appealing to the agricultural and religious background of the people, they managed to 
create a considerable amount of enthusiasm for the Socialist Party, a fact that proved a 
key element in the unprecedented election of 1914 where the Party's candidate for 
governor achieved second place. The German-born immigrant Oscar Ameringer proved 
vital in the spread of the movement's popularity. He started out as a trade unionist and 
spent portions of his life organizing labor organizations under socialist principles. He saw 
the deplorable conditions of the rural population, and was amazed when they flocked to 
hear his socialist message. As he put it, “these people had trudged in soaking rain… to 
hear a socialist speech… this indescribable aggregation of moisture, steam, dirt, rags, 
unshaven men, slatternly women and fretting children were farmers!”
3
 He also said that 
“the Oklahoma farmers’ living standard was so far below that of the sweatshop workers 
of the New York east side before the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers Unions had mopped up that human cesspool, that comparison 
could not be thought of.”
4
 He further described the desperation in uncompromising terms: 
I saw youngsters emaciated by hookworms, malnutrition, and pellagra, 
who had lost their second teeth before they were twenty years old. I saw 
tottering old male wrecks with the infants of their fourteen-year-old wives 
on their laps. I saw a white man begging a Choctaw squaw man who 
owned the only remaining spring in that neighborhood to let him have 
credit for a few buckets of water for his thirsty family. I saw humanity at 




The Socialists' quest for improving the lives of the state's lowest citizens drew criticism 
from the Oklahoman who called the crusade for better wages a ploy by aging bums or 




 Despite early condemnation, Socialists continually gained ground against both 
Democrats and Republicans throughout the beginning of the 1900s. During the 1910 
election, they achieved over 24,000 votes. In the 1912 election, their votes swelled to 
over 41,000, an increase of almost 50 percent and over 16 percent of the total votes cast.
7
 
Socialists enjoyed considerable support from western counties, with leftist agitation 
attempting inroads in resource rich counties in the east.
 8
  With the rise in popularity, the 
party became increasingly militant. During the 1914 election season, the Socialist 
candidate for governor from McAlester, Fred Holt, unleashed his attack on capitalism and 
started his campaign in earnest that May. Holt, a local district organizer for the 
nationwide union United Mine Workers (UMW), had even run for Congress in 1912.
9
  
Pat Nagle, popular with the farming class, served as the party's nomination for senator.
10
  
The size of Socialist popularity seemed inevitable. Dedicated and methodical 
proponents of the ideology, such as Patrick Nagle, Oscar Ameringer, and others, worked 
tirelessly in the agrarian regions of rural Oklahoma. Focusing primarily among tenant 
farmers, these organizers advocated systematic education rather than emotional agitation, 
and well-spoken lecturers stirred within the poverty-stricken population a need for 
opposition to what they saw as a ruthless and exploitative capitalist system.
11
 The social 
and cultural alienation of the rural poor provided a void for socialism to fill, and that in 
doing so, the Socialist Party "was nothing less than a massive social movement to 
reconstruct the shattered social order of the countryside.
12
 Working along with the party 
were the various unions that promoted improved conditions for its members. 
 Labor organizations remained an old and strong institution in the state, with the 
first doses coming from the Knights of Labor who immigrated to the territory in 1889. 
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Under the Haskell administration from 1907-11, the Socialists enjoyed an alliance with 
the Democratic Party, producing progressive oriented legislation during this time. Under 
the following one term governorship of Lee Cruce however, the alliance began to 
fracture.
13
 The situation for tenant farmers, the key base of the Socialist Party, devolved 
to alarming levels of desperation. According to the 1910 census, tenants operated 47,250 
farms in the state, while by 1920, the number rose to 104,137. Only 46,889 were free of 
mortgage debt, signaling a crisis in Oklahoma’s farming community that would propel 
the Socialists to even greater heights of popularity.
14
 This appears evident in one story 
among thousands that surfaced during the time period. A farmer recalled how he sold his 
cotton crop in 1905, and upon arrival in town looked for a reasonable buyer. The streets 
of the town were crowded with harvesters and men referred to as "street buyers" who 
brought together buyers and sellers. These agents, employed by local merchants, walked 
from wagon to wagon naming their price to each farmer for their crop. Their primary 
function, as employees of the merchants, was to drive the price of the commodity down 
as low as possible. When the farmer went to another purchaser, the price for their crop 
would be lower than the one before. Upon returning to the previous buyer, the price 
would be lowered yet again. After selling their product, farmers had to purchase supplies, 
usually from the same merchant who hired the street buyers.
15
  The control of resources 
remained the key issue, and farmers became caught up in a system that appeared rigged 
against them, perpetuating their eternal poverty with no hope of escape. In their 
desperation, many turned to the Socialist Party, forming a large base of support and 
providing clout for the organization's platform. 
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 Socialist demands followed the typical pattern laid out by Eugene Debs. Local 
organizations advocated public management of the banking system, governmental 
regulation of food, drugs, medicines, and clothing, national control of education and 
certification of teachers, government ownership of the railroads and other public utilities, 
strict regulation of petroleum production and cotton gin operations, public warehouses, 
currency expansion, abolition of middlemen in trade, a federal real estate exchange, a 
parcel post system, and taxation of churches. Oklahoma Socialists also asked for stricter 
controls over public accounts and the abolition of state control over city and county 
governments.
16
 These requests saw support across a wide swath of the population and 
contributed to its growing popularity in time for the upcoming election of 1914. 
 As the state entered a heated campaign season, the unpredictable politics of the 
state created a perfect storm that saw the Socialist Party achieve its most impressive 
electoral success in Oklahoma history. The Democratic primary introduced a cacophony 
of individuals jockeying for the governorship, including Supreme Court Commissioner 
JBA Robertson, of Chandler.
17
 The commissioner failed in his bid, as voters noted his 
lack of credentials in forming the original state government, his non-Southern heritage, 
and the backing of the unpopular and nearly impeached former Governor Lee Cruce.
18
 
The Democrats in this election represented a conservative mindset to the issues that beset 
the state while the Republican nominee showcased a progressive streak. The eventual 
Republican candidate for governor, John Fields, campaigned on the slogan “a cow, a 
sow, and a hen on every farm.”
19
 The Democrats eventually chose Robert L. Williams as 
their nominee, with the slogan “We will win with Williams.”
20
 The Socialists ran Fred 
Holt as their gubernatorial nominee and appeared poised to make considerable gains in 
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the election. One historian pointed out “the entire Democratic ticket in Oklahoma were 
running scared in 1914.”
21
 On voting day in November, Fred Holt, received 52,703 votes, 
roughly 21 percent of the total votes cast.
22
 He maintained a strong showing in Marshall 
county, receiving over 40 percent of the vote, and also made an impressive showing in 
twenty-eight other counties placing either first or second.
23
 More than 175 Socialists 
assumed local and county offices, with six sent to the state legislature after the election: 
five successful house members from western counties (Beckham, Dewey, Kiowa, Major, 
and Roger Mills), and one senator from the Beckham-Ellis-Roger Mills-Dewey district.
24
 
In both the third and seventh districts, the Socialists ran second to the Democrats, and ran 
close races in other districts, with Republicans narrowly beating them out.
25
 The Socialist 
Party showed itself to be an earnest contender for the number two spot in state politics, 
positioning itself as the Democrats’ main rival in many instances marginalizing the 
Republican Party. The Socialists, while achieving their largest success in state history, 
effectively divided the vote for the party in power, propelling Williams to power as the 
third governor of Oklahoma in January 1915. 
 The election of 1914 would remain the zenith of the party's power in the state. 
The fear and paranoia induced by World War I and the First Red Scare provided ultra-
patriotic and anti-communist forces an opportunity to deal a fatal blow to the movement, 
crippling its organization in the state and across the nation. Later, as agricultural prices 
rebounded, the resource aspect slowly disappeared as a draw to join the party. 
Regardless, the 1914 victory, as one historian put it, proved "the last great effort of an 
agrarian movement of general strength, as the inheritors of the Populist tradition rallied 




achievement set itself at odds with the populace in the post-war era, but for now, 
Socialists looked forward to their promised bright future. Within the state, they 
effectively fostered campaigns of education and recruitment, establishing summer 
Socialist encampments that allowed rural farming families to assemble and hear lessons 
on economic theory.
27
 Prominent speakers from across the country came, including 
Eugene Debs, Walter Thomas Mills, Kate Richards O’Hare, and Caroline Low.
28
 In 
1914, one group of Socialists even organized an entire 278-acre community in western 
LeFlore, with offers of $50 lots at $5 a month offered to party adherents.
29
 Several papers 
served as proponents of the party advocating their platform, such as the Oklahoma 
Pioneer and Appeal to Reason, with countless local outlets setting up their own dailies to 
increase party popularity. With the rise in attention, political leaders realized that the 
Socialist Party posed a serious threat to their success.  
 Politicians attempted to halt the advance of socialism, and incoming Governor 
Williams prepared himself to remove much of the momentum of their party by instituting 
several reforms. Offering a concession to labor, he reduced the hours women worked, an 
issue vetoed by Cruce two years prior.
30
 He also passed welfare laws to protect widows 
and children, with the afflicted group receiving $10 a month out of a fund from each 
county which could receive no more than $8,000 a year.
31
 Similarly, he created a $10 a 
month pension fund for Confederate veterans, which paled in comparison to the federal 
grant to Union veterans. The governor spearheaded legislation to regulate warehouses, 
bring cotton gins within the category of public utilities, and extend school land leases for 
five years. These measures, while seemingly progressive, showcased little more than a 




 The growing fear of the party establishment against the increasing might of 
the Socialists appeared a legitimate one, as the far-leftists appeared poised to expand as 
rapidly as it had done in previous years.  
 Democrats continued to fear for their viability, and soon faced a serious crisis. In 
1915 the United States Supreme Court annulled Oklahoma's grandfather clause, a major 
hindrance to equal voting rights for blacks. This unleashed a flurry of panic, as a 
proposed coalition of blacks, Republicans and Socialists threatened Democratic 
supremacy.
33
 In response Governor Williams convened a special session of the legislature 
in January 1916. Lawmakers proposed an amendment to replace the grandfather clause, 
leaving in a literacy test for voting. This would also limit voters among the poor white 
population, many of whom were illiterate. A second measure proposed to amend election 
law forcing ineligible citizens from 1914 to register between April 30 and May 11, or be 
barred forever from voting. Republicans and Socialists combined their efforts, and after a 
special election ballot helped defeat the amendment.
 34
 Socialists achieved a small 
victory, and looked forward to continued electoral success. 
 With the arrival of the First World War however, the tide against socialism in the 
state and nationwide would irrevocably change, signaling a continual spiral into the realm 
of paranoia and persecution involving resources, radicals, labor, and business. These 
actions would lead directly into the First Red Scare, providing a basis for the overreaction 
and fear that characterized the event. In 1917, the United States declared war on the 
Central Powers, thus entering the great conflict among European nations. The Oklahoma 
government, eager to prove itself as a loyal state, initiated a strident campaign of liberty 
bond sales and military recruitment. With the upheaval in the international system, 
 36 
Oklahomans increasingly saw anti-war and anti-government sentiments, often linked with 
socialism, as tantamount to treason. This required oversight and punishment and to that 
end, the Williams administration created an Oklahoma State Council of Defense headed 
by J.M. Aydelotte.
35
 The government placed local community leaders in charge of the 
individual county branches, who promoted educating the civilian population on their 
duties during wartime. The council also evolved to include persecution of seditious 
activities, vigilantism, and terror. The targets of these acts invariably included the 
Socialist Party in Oklahoma, as it took a prominent anti-war stance.
36
  
 An unprecedented wave of paranoia swept across the state and nation against any 
seen as aiding the enemy or standing against the country's war effort. The government 
tolerated the hysteria and even encouraged elements of it, as it aided in the suppression of 
radical elements in society. This attitude formed an early basis of the Red Scare mentality 
after the war's conclusion. Certain citizens often wrote letters to the governor, suggesting 
that the war provided an "irresistible opportunity" to discredit and destroy the socialist 
movement.
37
 Further displaying the growing sentiment that opposition to the war equaled 
treason, Oklahoma congressman Dick T. Morgan proclaimed that all patriotic Americans 
needed to purchase liberty bonds, claiming that “We will be derelict in our duty as 
citizens of this Republic if we do not respond to the appeal of the President.”
38
 Such calls 
for Americanism and persecution of supposed disloyalty played a major role in 
destroying the Socialist Party nationwide. 
To its detriment amidst the patriotic fervor, the organization attempted to take a 
platform of non-interference and pacifism in the war. According to one pamphlet, “If we 
send an armed force to the battlefields of Europe, its cannon will mow down the masses 
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of the German people and not the Imperial German government.  Our entrance into the 
European conflict at this time will serve only to multiply the horrors of the war….”
39
 The 
piece went on to state that the American working class had no quarrel with the German 
working class, and that they branded the declaration of war by our government as a crime 
against the people of the United States and against the nations of the world.”
40
 Early 
manifestations of fear and paranoia gripped the nation, and various newspapers portrayed 
socialists in alarming tones. The Oklahoman reprinted stories from other states 
highlighting the group's so-called deviancy. In one instance, the title of a headline was 
“Socialists Defy City Ordinance,” with the main article covering how an organizer was 
arrested while addressing a group of people, in violation of a new ordinance requiring a 
permit from the mayor to conduct street speeches.
41
 Other incriminating headlines 
included “Socialist Fought Liberty Bond Sales,” with a story of how Socialist leaders 
were indicted for printing an advertisement in their paper urging readers not to buy 
liberty bonds.
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 A major blow against the Socialists occurred  later as the public linked 
them with a local draft riot that threatened to spread to Washington, DC. 
 In August 1917, with threats of communism looming on the horizon, Oklahoma 
experienced its own event that represented a crushing blow to the socialist movement and 
the growing fear against radicalism. That month, local draft-rioters attempted to organize 
a march on Washington, DC. These individuals revolted against a war they believed was 
not their fight. Previously, in June of that year, state officials expected 215,000 
Oklahomans to register for the draft, in accordance with the Conscription Act. Less than 
half that number did so with 72 percent of those registered claiming exemption to avoid 
military service.
43
 The locations with the heaviest cotton farming, and the lowest levels of 
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development, principally in the south and the east, experienced the highest levels of 
disturbances during this time. In Okmulgee County, members of the Working Class 
Union (WCU) dynamited a local town’s water works, while in Seminole County, a letter 
written by a local told of an imminent uprising of farmers that would destroy the town, 




On August 3, an estimated 1,000 armed members of the WCU convened in 
southeastern counties along the South Canadian River in a planned march on Washington 
to force an end to the draft. Along the way, they would gather followers and sabotage 
transportation and communication lines to inhibit authorities’ implementation of 
recruitment. They planned on living off the land, feasting on ripening corn in the fields, 
thus giving rise to the rebellion's name. Within three days, local authorities and posse 
members rounded up suspects and virtually destroyed the rebellion before it began.
45
 
Evidence of the dangers of the coup quickly surfaced, as investigators found hidden 
caches of dynamite, strychnine, and weapons. Officials arrested 450 alleged members of 
the conspiracy, causing Harlow’s Weekly to respond that this sampling represented only a 
small fraction of the true numbers of trouble-makers. The major result of the rebellion 
was that government authorities and the public would associate all Socialists with this 
act, and suppression soon became systematic. By the end of the war, authorities jailed 
many of the major Socialist leaders in the state, including Fred Holt. The party's dues-
paying membership went down to 65 percent, essentially resulting in its destruction from 
the war-related persecution.
46
 That very same persecution continued after the war. With 
no main enemy to focus its attention on, the paranoia-induced suppression instead would 
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turn its head towards labor disturbances centered around resource production, magnifying 
countless cases into Bolshevik inspired coups. By war's end, however, the state turned 
towards electing a new governor. This new administration would play the largest part in 
magnifying the Red Scare hysteria, overreacting and hyping a number of labor disputes 
across the state, eventually calling out the national guard more times than any 
government in Oklahoma history. 
As the war reached its bloody conclusion in 1918 the state went to the polls to 
elect a new governor, Democrat JBA Robertson. Supported by oilmen in the east, 
Robertson easily won the contest, defeating his rival Horace G. McKeever 104,132 to 
82,865.
47
 Thanks to the crushing effect of war paranoia and government actions against 
the Party, Socialist candidate Pat Nagle received a paltry 7,438 votes. Robertson, the first 
governor elected from the former Oklahoma Territory, was born on a farm in Iowa in 
1871. He arrived in Oklahoma in 1893, and settled in Chandler teaching school, working 
as a section hand, raising cotton on a tenant farm, and studying law.
48
 He eventually 
found employment on the district bench, which propelled him to membership in the State 
Capitol Commission and he later became Supreme Court Commissioner under Cruce for 
three years. He failed at attaining membership in congress, but remained active in 
countless extra-political organizations including the Knights of Pythias, Elks, Modern 
Woodmen of the World, the Freemasons, and was a regular member of the Episcopal 
Church.
49
 Upon assuming office and in his first message to the legislature in 1919, he 
pointedly stated that “Oklahoma is no longer the baby state; we have passed the day of 
swaddling clothes, and have donned the habiliments of full grown manhood.”
50
 And like 
any man seeking to prove their worth to their elder, Robertson sought to put Oklahoma 
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firmly in the camp of loyalty, and to rid the state of its image as Socialist leaning state 
with proclivities for anarchism that threatened the region's resources. To that end, the 
governor used the national guard more than all his predecessors combined, and before his 
first year as governor ended, had spent more than $100,000 in excess of appropriations 
for the Adjutant General’s office.
51
  
 Robertson originally came to the governorship on a platform of state sponsored 
marketing cooperators for farmers, lower property taxes for businesses, support for 
school consolidation for educators, and support for anti-radicalism.
52
 Laws passed under 
the governor soon turned towards suppression of dissent within the state, following a 
nationwide trend that fanned the flames of Red Scare hysteria. In 1919, the Seventh 
Legislature convened and proposed House Bill No. 80, providing for teaching only in 
English in public, parochial, denominational, and private schools through the seventh 
grade. The bill passed 94-3 in the House and was completely unopposed in the Senate 23-
0.
53
 Two other bills surfaced and passed the legislative session in January 1919. One law 
prohibited criminal syndicalism while the other forbade the display of red flags at 
political events. The author of the former measure, Luther Harrison, lived in Wewoka 
near the site of the Green Corn Rebellion. The legislature defined criminal syndicalism as 
a doctrine 
which advocates crime, physical violence, arson, destruction of property, 
sabotage, or other unlawful acts or methods, as a means of accomplishing 
or effecting industrial or political ends, or as a means of effecting 




Violators of the act could expect a maximum penalty of ten years in jail and a $5,000 
fine. The bill also provided for the punishment of any owner or agent who knowingly 
rented a place to criminal syndicalism advocates. The law passed unanimously in the 
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Senate 35-0 and in the House 82-4. Oklahoma joined thirteen commonwealths and two 
territories in passing criminal syndicalism legislation, while thirteen other states enacted 
anti-sedition and anarchy laws, and twenty-nine adopted a similar red flag law. In 
Oklahoma, the maximum penalty for display of a red flag carried a $1,000 fine and ten 
years in jail. No test of the red flag law ever occurred in courts, while there have been 




The bills in Oklahoma represented the spirit of the nation, with rampant fear and a 
people eager to demonstrate their tough stance towards anti-Americanism. In other states, 
the hysteria ran just as deep. In Texas, ultra-patriotic elements utilized repressive tactics 
in preventing pro-union candidates from achieving electoral success. Texas governor Jim 
Ferguson was impeached by such methods, accused of harboring pro-German 
sympathies, and soundly defeated by his opponent in the 1918 election.
56
 Near the end of 
World War I, Russia became engulfed in the throws of revolution. Communists 
continually gained ground against their enemies, and heralded the start of a worldwide 
Bolshevik revolution. The fear and patriotism drummed up during the war years was 
refocused by Oklahoma Governor Robertson against the new enemy, purported 
communist, socialist and anarchist agitators. On March 12, 1919, a letter sent to 
Robertson stated confidence in his ability in making America and its children safe from 
“Bolsheviki foreigners, I.W.W. or alien slackers.”
57
 The author claimed that America 
“should help purge our Nation of the un-desirables – the anarchistic foreign element and 
the alien slackers who have been and are now holding fat jobs as the expense of our 




movement by a congressman in Washington encouraged the naturalization of all aliens 
residing in the nation, and wrote specifically to Robertson, beseeching him to encourage 
all churches, temples and synagogues to promote the movement.
59
 Public sentiment 
appeared on the side of the governor, allowing him to pursue harsher policies in response 
to domestic events. There were few outbursts against such legislation, coming primarily 
from left-leaning organizations and labor unions. 
 On March 17, 1919, John Wilkinson, president of the local UMW affiliate 
headquartered in Muskogee, took umbrage to the rash of anti-Bolshevik legislation. In a 
letter to the governor, he stated that he failed to see the necessity for such measures with 
regard to unions, as practically all vital industries of the state were organized and on 
record as being absolutely opposed to Bolshevism. He later said that "as far as our 




 The actions of Robertson that drew ire from leftist movements occurred within a 
context of larger national events that were reshaping the very fabric of post-war society. 
Prices of goods and the cost of living experienced a sharp increase, and amidst these 
economic troubles countless workers went on strike demanding renegotiation of their 
contracts signed during the war era that froze many of their wages for the conflict's 
duration. Upon the conclusion of the war, many businesses found renegotiation of the 
contract difficult. Compounding the situation, millions of men returned from the front 
and attempted to find jobs. Older workers tried to hang on to their old  one's, and faced 
with an economic crisis that threatened to upset the entire country, the nation faced a 
series of dramatic strikes centered primarily around its major resource producing 
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industries. Workers demanded increased wages to offset the rising cost of living, while 
businesses proclaimed their inability to grant such concessions given the economic 
situation. As their only bargaining chip, laborers across America threatened and often did 
carry out strikes, paralyzing the nation's industry in the hopes of forcing a settlement. 
One early indication of this dissatisfied labor activity occurred in Seattle, and became one 
of the first major strikes that affected the country during the First Red Scare.  
 On February 6, 1919, Seattle, Washington, experienced one of the first opening 
volleys of the Red Scare conflict, and became the center of attention for the entire nation. 
Disturbed by the country-wide wage freeze that remained unaltered after the conclusion 
of World War I, Seattle shipyard workers threatened a walk-out unless they received a 
pay increase. Regulators refused and the Metal Trades Council, representing over 35,000 
workers, declared a strike, effectively closing the shipyards. Shortly thereafter, 110 other 
local unions voted in favor of a sympathy walkout, creating one of the largest general 
strikes in US history.
61
 Before the workers even closed shop, local newspapers painted 
the employees as lazy and suffering from Bolshevik influences. “Why these men gave up 
the highest wages they ever earned in their lives when there had not even been a 
suggestion of reduction, and like a pack of sheep, walked out… probably seems a 
mystery to the average American.”
62
 The article then portrayed a typical labor union 
meeting as a conglomeration of seditious behaviors spearheaded by Bolsheviks, and that 
they were criminals by instinct, desired to see Bolshevism supplant law and order, and 
their primary concern in Seattle was to stir up trouble.
63
  
These lessons of suspicion and paranoia were not lost on Oklahoma, which 
looked towards the strike with alarming tones. The Daily Oklahoman reported in bold 
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headlines that "troops armed with grenades in cities where 70,000 strike."
64
 News of the 
Seattle strike appeared prominently in countless Oklahoma papers, with readers eagerly 
taking in news of the disorder. Washington State, inspired by the dramatic events 
unfolding and following along Oklahoma lines, saw an influx of legislation aimed at 
curbing alien influences. One such bill, proposed by Representative Robert Grass, sought 
to prohibit foreigners from participating in strike movements. It held that “any person not 
a citizen of the United States who shall urge, advise, or advocate in any manner 
whatsoever any strike shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be 
sentenced accordingly.” The maximum penalty carried a fine of $5,000 and ten years in a 
penitentiary.
65
 A combination of increased military and police presence, as well as union 
fears of a backlash contributed to the cessation of union activities however, and on 
February 11, labor leaders called off the general strike.
66
 The strike served as a major 
warning throughout the entire nation, with lessons that resonated especially in Oklahoma. 
The first attack against controlling industry during the First Red Scare occurred centered 
on the nation's shipbuilders and metal workers. Future disturbances would occur 
involving the resources of the country, and by the summer, radical attacks against 
government officials propelled the Red Scare fear to new heights. 
 The national situation seemed to deteriorate, and by the summer of 1919, all the 
fears and anxieties brought about by the war-induced paranoia came to a head during the 
First Red Scare. That summer, a wave of anarchist bombings occurred throughout the 
country.
67
 Targeting numerous government personnel, the act spread dread and panic 
across a nation that had not yet fully recovered from World War I and gave many 
individuals reason to fear for their safety.
68
 After the incident, the US media seized on the 
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issue, with countless newspapers printing headlines escalating the hysteria. A public 
outcry soon called for the apprehension of those responsible for the violent terrorist acts 
and demanded their immediate prosecution.
69
 Leftist organizations including anarchists, 
communists, and socialists bore the brunt of the blame, with the New York Times calling 
Socialism an "alien enemy," while the Hartford Courant urged further legislation to 
punish anarchists. These groups faced a wave of arrests and deportations spearheaded by 
US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Under his tenure, the Department of Justice 
conducted one of the most extensive raids in American history, rounding up thousands 
for proposed deportation. His flagrant violations of rights in conducting the raids held 
great support from the American people, as countless citizens feared for their safety in 
the wake of the successful Bolshevik Revolution, threats of communism spreading across 
the globe, and most recently the rash of radical bombings.  
 The population in Oklahoma appeared drummed up with hysteria as well, as 
national events continued to shape local policy. The government told the state to remain 
forever vigilant against the enemy of the nation, and after the bombing campaign, the 
governor contacted Palmer directly and sent word of a local periodical, the Liberator, 
which appeared disruptive in its language against the government.
70
 The governor’s 
office continually sent copies of the Liberator to Palmer throughout the summer.
71
 The 
Department of Justice responded stating that the publication was under the observation of 
the Bureau of Investigation.
72
 The magazine served as a political and cultural outlet for 
“radical intellectuals” and also acted as an unofficial organ of the Socialist Party during 
the war. The publication supported the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and aligned itself 
with the communist movement afterwards.
73
 Thanks to the suspicious eye of Robertson 
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and his readiness to comply with the dictates of Palmer, the magazine remained another 
target of the alarmist sentiment of the time. Further events escalated the paranoia, and by 
September 1919, another strike made headlines across the country. 
That month, the Boston police force faced a mounting crisis. Sharing much in 
common with labor related dissidents, the policemen requested adjustment to their fixed 
wages, long hours, and seven day work weeks. To accomplish this, they realized that 
their only hope lay in unionizing, as they thought it the best tool available to them for 
negotiating. To that end they turned towards the American Federation of Labor (AFL) for 
assistance. In response, Massachusetts’s state officials suspended over a dozen union 
organizers among the police force, causing an internal crisis for the beleaguered officers. 
On September 9, with a vote of 1134 to 2, Boston policemen decided to go on strike. 
Immediately the press labeled the event as Bolshevist inspired, with one local newspaper 
stating that "behind Boston in this skirmish with Bolshevism stands Massachusetts, and 
behind Massachusetts stands America."
74
 The lack of police presented the city with a 
severe problem however, as there was no protection against lawlessness. After several 
nights of hooliganism and minor destruction, members of the State Guard arrived and 
restored order. The two sides never reached a compromise, and on September 13 the 
police commissioner refused to re-hire the striking workers, opting instead to hire new 
recruits. The legacy of the strike showcased a populace eager to believe tales of 
revolutionary Bolshevism among the force, despite the lack of evidence. The Boston 





 Disproportionate fear of Bolshevism remained a mainstay across the US and in 
Oklahoma, and strikes across the nation in many of its sensitive and resource producing 
areas only served to heighten this fear. In 1919, there existed roughly 75,000 members of 
the Communist Party within the US. Countless publications sought to increase that 
number however, with one estimating the number closer to 5,000,000.
76
 This inflated 
amount caused severe panic among the citizenry and media, who remained all too eager 
to hype up the destructive threat of radical labor in the vital areas of resource production 
across the country. 
 As the volatile summer turned to fall, another major strike occurred that held 
startling implications for Oklahoma. On September 22, 1919, for the first time during the 
Red Scare, unions initiated a nation-wide strike over resources that affected states and 
workers across the entire country. The strike involved thousands of steel workers who 
desired to renegotiate their contracts. This act affected countless laborers who abided by 
national union rules, and meant that strikes were not merely limited to one location where 
dissatisfaction was highest. While Oklahoma was not directly involved in the strike, the 
event once again heightened distrust between the populace and labor movements, and 
predated by two months another national strike that would drag the state deep into the 
heart of Red Scare paranoia and overreaction.  The event appeared a long time coming, as 
for several years, the AFL attempted to unionize steel mills throughout the country. 
Spearheaded in part by William Z. Foster, his National Committee for Organizing Iron 
and Steel Workers successfully recruited members into its group, with significant 
numbers coming from immigrant populations.
77
 Foster represented all that was dangerous 
to business interests, following the teachings of William Jennings Bryan, maintaining 
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affiliation with Socialism, and holding previous membership in the radical IWW. With 
Foster’s assistance, the AFL requested a meeting on June 20 with United States Steel’s 
board of director to lay out demands for collective bargaining, eight-hour work days, one 
day off a week, double pay for overtime, and other important issues. After never 
receiving a reply, and future attempts at negotiation failing, the labor organization voted 
for a strike on September 10, with the actual walkout occurring on September 22 of 
1919.
78
 When the fateful day arrived, approximately 275,000 workers walked out, with 
their numbers increasing to over 365,000 by the end of the week.
79
 Immediately, the 
national press painted the conflagration in paranoid terms, with the New York Tribute 
calling it “another experiment in the way of Bolshevizing American industry.”
80
 Socialist 
newspapers did not aid matters either, increasing the rhetoric calling the strike “open 




 Oklahoma newspapers reported on the events with alarming tones, following the 
mainstream media with sensationalist articles. In one piece, the Oklahoman told of a gun 
battle between police and rioters at the Carnegie Steel Mill plant in Pennsylvania. On 
October 4, events occurred that severely undermined the striking worker’s position. In 
Gary, Indiana, radical calls rang out for open revolution. Deadly rioting occurred after 
steel companies introduced strike breakers to the situation, and the Governor of Indiana, 
James P. Goodrich, ordered the state militia into Gary to quell the unrest.
82
 The rioting 
grew exponentially after this, with 500 strikers attempting to breach the United States 
Steel Corporation plant. The governor immediately called for federal troops, which soon 




 Samuel Gompers, founder of the AFL, attempted to resolve the situation, 
and after negotiations ended in failure, he bowed out of the issue. The strike situation 
soon collapsed, as public support turned against labor, and the government set up a 
commission to discover the causes of the incident.
84
 Despite this, the causes remain clear 
as the growing struggle over control of resources, pitting labor against business amidst 
the fearful climate of the time, guaranteed that the nation would paint the strikers as 
Bolshevist inspired. Logic gave way to reason as entities found ways to link wage 
disputes with radical communist elements that admittedly desired to overthrow the US 
government, thus enabling them to squelch their opposition. 
 On November 1, 1919, yet another major nationwide strike occurred that the 
government and media painted as communist-inspired. This time, the disturbance 
centered around the vital coal producing regions of the country, including Oklahoma, 
when members of the UMW walked off the job. Once again, resources served as the 
primary focal point for disturbances in the ongoing troubles of the First Red Scare. The 
ensuing strike affected countless states, over 400,000 miners, and caused Oklahoma to 
declare martial law for fear of a Bolshevik uprising. The event stands as a main pillar of 
the First Red Scare in Oklahoma, becoming a major cause for hysteria and discord in the 
state. Several other states also called out the national guard, as authorities viewed the 
striking workers as communists who threatened the nation's supply of fuel for the coming 
winter. The two sides reached an agreement on December 10, but not before severe 
damage had been done to the reputation of miners nationwide.
85
 The cause of labor 
against business over control of resources took a severe hit, with the country showcasing 
its willingness to link genuine appeals for better conditions with a growing communist 
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conspiracy. Much of 1919 revolved around this developing hysteria, and clashes between 
authorities and leftist movements only increased in frequency and volatility. 
 Displaying the bloody nature of the growing conflict, a dramatic incident served 
to round out the year in Centralia, Washington, on November 11, 1919. During an 
Armistice Day celebration, clashes erupted between the American Legion and workers 
affiliated with the IWW.  The American Legion, an organization representing veterans of 
the United States, had descended on Centralia to participate in a local parade.  As 
members of the American Legion passed in front of the hall of the Wobblies, shots rang 
out and killed members of the Legion. The IWW claimed the right-wing group became 
enraged at the sight of their meeting place and charged up the steps to do them harm, so 
the union fired in self defense. Authorities arrested many in the socialist group and placed 
them in jail. Soon after, a mob formed around the suspects and eventually took one of the 
IWW leaders from his cell. The frenzied and hate-filled group proceeded to beat his teeth 
in with a rifle butt, castrate him, tied a noose around his neck, and threw him over a 
bridge three times before his neck broke.  The man in question was named Wesley 
Everest, a union member and World War I veteran.  He had stood in front of the IWW 
hall and was reported to have said “I fought for Democracy in France and I’m going to 
fight for it here.  The first man that comes through this hall, why, he’s going to get it.”
86
  
After his death, the town’s coroner reported Everest’s death as a suicide and he was later 
buried in an unmarked grave.  Eight IWW members were later convicted of murder and 
given sentences of 25 to 40 years in prison.  No community members were ever brought 
to trial for the lynching. The despicable act set off a reaction of police and mob violence 




 This, along with the earlier bombing campaigns and strikes, gave rise to a severe 
need among the public for the government to take swift action against all manifestations 
of radicalism, either real or implied.  
 Helping to allay these fears, Attorney General Palmer continued in his drive 
against agitators, stepping up raids by December 1919 and into January of the new year. 
By early 1920, the country was further engulfed in the fires of Red Scare fear. In this 
maelstrom of labor unrest, union radicalism, and paranoid induced repression, Oklahoma 
faced its own troubles as the country threatened to explode. Not merely an isolated state 
separated by thousands of miles from the troubles in the East and the West, Oklahoma 
remained profoundly affected by the actions taken around the country during the First 
Red Scare. The state witnessed events on the national scene and became swept up in a 
similar frenzy. Influenced by events across the country, Oklahoma's leaders would look 
to their own labor issues in alarmingly similar fashions, portraying countless incidents of 
disorder as radical plots aimed at toppling the government. The populace also played a 
role, abandoning the Socialists in favor of the national pro-war fervor. By the end of 
1918, Oklahomans had all but deserted the party and signaled its death knell. Disputes 
over resources, existing since the state's inception, would continue to act as the primary 
focal point for disturbances across the state, mimicking events across the country. These 
events played a large part in influencing the heavy-handed response by Oklahoma and 
other states, and helped create the ingredients for the Red Scare mentality of fear and 
paranoia to thrive. Particularly in eastern Oklahoma, in the rich Cushing-Drumright 
oilfields, and in Tulsa, radicals would make inroads that contributed to the panic shared 
by the populace, businesses, and the government. As sentiment grew against such groups 
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in the climate of fear, the state laid further foundations to the increasingly solid structure 
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Chapter 3: Oil Fields and Labor Unions in Oklahoma, 1917-1919 
With the increasing instability across the nation caused by World War I and the 
foundations for radicalism and disputes over resources laid by Oklahoma's past, the state 
further integrated itself into the hyper-patriotic and paranoid mentality prevalent in 
America that characterized the First Red Scare. The state continued to give in to the 
irrational fears of the day and acted harshly towards unions that attempted to provide 
better conditions for workers. Violent clashes also occurred in eastern Oklahoma as law 
enforcement fought in a lopsided battle with labor during 1917-1919. These disturbances 
centered around important oil rich regions with resources once again acting as a catalyst 
for agitation and hostility. Through such labor disputes and irrational fears, overzealous 
officials and citizens created the perfect storm for the First Red Scare to flourish in the 
post-war era. 
As witnessed on the national scene, nearly every major disturbance centered on 
labor issues and control of resources. Workers continually appealed for increased wages 
and better treatment, while representatives of business stated they were neither willing 
nor able to comply with demands, given the economic situation. Unions played a major 
part in this struggle, and fought heated battles in Oklahoma to improve the wages and 
conditions of laborers in the state's primary resource industries. This attracted a number 
of radicals as well, providing further fuel to the flames of paranoia. Prominent unions in 
the state included the Oklahoma Renters' Union, which represented a number of 
sharecroppers in McClain County hoping to resist rent increases from landowners. In 
Choctaw County in the southeast, a Grower's Protective Association recruited 9,000 
members to fight usury in the courts.
1
 One of the largest of such organizations, the 
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Working Class Union, extended from its home state of Arkansas into the cotton belt of 
eastern Oklahoma. Founded in 1914, it represented between 18,000 and 35,000 members 
at its zenith. In the troubled time of the World War I and post-war era, the WCU 
espoused radicalism and anarchism to achieve its goals. Rejecting the nonviolent methods 
of socialists who sought to effect change through voting, the WCU resorted to burning 
barns, flogging opponents, shootings, and robbing banks.
2
 Government officials quickly 
linked these radical union actions with the broader socialist movement and initiated 
campaigns and crackdowns on suspects through the 1910s. The media played a large part 
in these efforts, linking the Socialist Party with nearly every disturbance, and questioning 
the mild reformist ideas that earlier authorities had granted a fair hearing.
3
  
The United Mine Workers (UMW), remained strong in the state. Founded in 1898, 
and made up of socialists, the group originally espoused militancy to achieve its goals. 
With the success of the Twin Territories Federation of Labor in electing delegates to the 
Oklahoma constitutional convention, the UMW turned towards the democratic process 
and utilized peaceful methods to achieve its aims.
4
 
Lead and zinc industries in northeastern Oklahoma also attracted workers, with 
the region forming the tri-state mining district with Kansas and Missouri. The area 
remained low for radical activity during the First Red Scare, as authorities had earlier 
stamped out all forms of resistance from the unions. Originally, the radical labor union, 
the IWW, had established roots in the area in 1906, with a base located in Joplin, 
Missouri, from which to spread out its recruitment arm. The Knights of Labor also had 
initiated activities locally as early as 1889. In June 1915, three thousand miners in the tri-
state district struck for better wages, with mines shut down for three weeks. Operators 
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later broke the strike, and promised to pay a sliding scale of wages based on the average 
price of ore. The ill-fated strike utterly demoralized the cause of tri-state mine 
unionization for twenty years. Unsuccessful attempts were made to increase unionization 
but met with little success, so that by the time of the First Red Scare in 1919, there 
existed little apparatus for resistance.
5
 
The Industrial Workers of the World, or Wobblies, persevered in Oklahoma, 
however, becoming part of the largest disturbances in the state at that time. The union 
propagated the abolishment of the capitalist system and hoped to usher in a new 
revolutionary society.
6
 Founded in 1905 in Chicago, the group quickly spread across the 
nation wherever labor needed their particular brand of assistance. In 1906, at the time of 
their second convention, the Wobblies established themselves in Oklahoma, setting up 
three branches in Oklahoma Territory and two in Indian Territory.
7
 By 1907, with the 
large number of unskilled and impoverished laborers in the state, the union found success 
and recruited a few thousand dues-paying members. A major focus of the group lay in 
propaganda and agitation, with the organization regularly spreading leaflets and flyers 
denouncing the capitalist system and espousing their own ideals. This caused great alarm 
among business interests and the citizenry, especially as the Wobblies spread into the oil-
rich locations of eastern Oklahoma. Authorities and the media continually linked major 
disturbances to the IWW, including the Green Corn Rebellion, and by the time of the 
United States' entry into World War I, the radical union appeared to the public as a 
dangerous, disloyal menace prone to anti-American rhetoric and violent acts against 
government and business interests.
8
 Nevertheless, the group found some success among 
the poor and the immigrant populations of the state, and encountered its fiercest battles in 
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the oil rich towns of eastern Oklahoma. As the Tulsa World later put it, the eastern half of 
the state "appears to be the section most attractive to the anarchists because of its 
immense oil and other industries."
9
  
The IWW came to the region primarily because of its resources in the oil fields. 
Several important oil towns thrived in these fields, including Cushing, Drumright, Oilton, 
and Tulsa. This particular area in Oklahoma rested on the Central Red-Bed Plains and the 
Northern Limestone-Cuesta Plains, two areas rich with abundant supplies of petroleum. 
The site of a major oil strike in 1912, the region became a leading center in the industry. 
By 1915, the area produced over 8 million barrels of oil per month. It served as a key 
railroad hub, with the Stillwater Central connecting to the Burlington Northern-Santa Fe 
line that crisscrossed into neighboring states.
 
It also maintained an important link to the 
cattle ranching industry, increasing its desirability both as a target of agitation, and as a 
goal to be protected.
10
  The massive and sudden industrial influx caused by the oil 
industry created an abundance of jobs, attracting the attention of the IWW who sought to 
win over converts. As with other locations across the state and the country, the location 
of resources played a key component in attracting the level of agitation and Red Scare 
activity.  
While the Wobblies attempted to make inroads in the east, one of its oil towns, 
Cushing, remained resistant to its advances, and held some of the lowest turnout of votes 
for Socialist Party candidates in the years leading up to the war.
11
 The IWW however, 
possessed a certain appeal to many who looked with desperation on the capitalist system 
they saw as taking advantage of the tenant farming working class. As one Cushing oil 
worker put it, “The IWW has got the clearest and cleanest cut declaration of any outfit 
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going. I know the organization has got no halfway grounds with the capitalists.”
12
 The 
local oil companies maintained a strong anti-union stance, and encouraged many acts of 
violence against workers by Ku Klux Klan members and local police.
13
 From a resource 
point of view, the IWW attempts at gaining a foothold in the Oklahoma oil industry 
proved risky, as the relatively new resource would be closely guarded by the federal 
government. During the war years of 1916 and 1917 however, the IWW enlarged its 
member base nationally from 40,000 to 100,000.
14
  
As the organization gained clout, authorities took measures to counteract its 
growing influence. On October 29 in the eastern oil hub of Tulsa, an explosion damaged 
the  home of the manager for Carter Oil, J. Edgar Pew. Immediately the media blamed 
the IWW, and a report in the Oklahoman claimed that the city was on its toes all night, 
expecting at any moment to hear dynamite explosions in or near the oil refineries, or 
shots fired. Tulsa sought to raise a defense force of 250 men while the council of defense 
worked with the governor to procure ammunition for the eventual witch hunt. The city 
immediately boosted its defense around major refineries, with the Cosden refinery, one of 
the largest in the nation, protected by over three hundred men. The Carter Oil company 
stated that they had tripled their guard, and expected explosions before dawn. The article 
concluded with a warning, saying that unless IWW members made a secret retreat, bodily 
harm would come to them, and that all persons not able to give a good reason for being 
on the streets that night would be ordered by authorities to head for their homes as soon 
as possible.
15
 The hunt was on for the suspects in the bombing, and local forces from the 
start took matters into their own hands.  
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Suspicion against union members increased dramatically throughout the war years, 
and intensified with each event, whether they were at fault or not. In Ada, one day after 
the explosion in Tulsa, fires occurred so frequently that county officials feared the 
Working Class Union was behind the action. They admitted that the organization had 
been inactive since the rounding up and arrest the previous August of several hundred 




In Tulsa, authorities commenced raids on IWW headquarters on November 5, 
1917, causing the eventual crippling of the network in Oklahoma. The action netted 
eleven men, and as one local headline put it, "war on the IWW was declared by the city 
of Tulsa last night."
17
 Authorities, for lack of evidence, placed a charge of vagrancy on 
the individuals, and bluntly stated they planned to arrest every man known to belong to 
the "un-American organization."
18
 The Tulsa World categorized most of the men as 
uncouth in appearance and described the Wobbly base as rife with seditious paraphernalia. 
On the day of the raid, police found the members simply gathered around a table playing 
cards and reading. They offered no resistance upon arrest, and the paper reported that as 
they marched to their cells, their heads remained erect, with sneers on their faces and 
"looking for all the world like 'martyrs' marching to their doom.
19
 Displaying the 
paranoid attitudes that made freedom of expression difficult during that time, the paper 
surmised that any attorney in Tulsa risked attracting contempt from "loyal" citizens by 
representing the defendants. Captain Wilkerson of the Tulsa Police Department later 
stated his intent to arrest every man found loitering around the IWW headquarters, and if 
they got out of jail only to head back there, he would arrest them "again, and again and 
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again. Tulsa is not big enough to hold any traitors during our government's crisis, and the 
sooner these fellows get out of town the better for them."
20
  
During this time of unionism and suppression in the eastern oil fields, the public 
worried over the region's image, afraid that all the radical attention gave it a bad name. 
An article encouraging pro-Americanism appeared two days after the much publicized 
Tulsa raid, stating that the city required a new face. Detailing stories of draft resistance, 
dynamite bombings, and other instances of violence, the paper said that "upon such 
stories people often base their opinion of a state or a community. Not a rosy picture of 
Tulsa and Oklahoma is it?"
21
 The World claimed that, since Oklahoma was practically a 
new state, strangers could associate the area with outlaws and radicals. To combat the 
negative publicity generated by the rampant disorder, the paper intended to produce a run 
of stories detailing Oklahoma's positive contributions to the country. This example 
detailed a growing fear that the area would be known for its radicals, and served as a 




Further revealing the xenophobic tendencies of the populace, the State Council of 
Defense warned that "a blank wall and a firing squad may soon be the remedy for the 
pro-Germanism in Oklahoma in the few sections where it exists."
23
 Channeling the fear 
that was already in the process of redirection to Socialist and Communist elements, the 
council went on to say that the man not aiding in America's fight against Germany was 
aiding instead the Prussian to slaughter his neighbor's sons. "We must realize that a 
disloyal remark is an assassin's shot at every boy wearing khaki. Those living in 
American can be of but two classes, Americans or enemies."
24
 The article concluded with 
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a near prophetic warning to those making anti-American remarks, stating that, while they 
may not be molested now, a "day of wrath is coming in America," and that the State 
Council of Defense was already hard at work turning over information concerning 
disloyal statements to federal authorities.
25
 The stage for the state to enter the First Red 
Scare appeared completely set, with the entire population drummed up with irrational 
fear and suspicion, ready to pounce on the slightest hint of disloyalty, especially in 
geographically strategic areas. 
On November 8, 1917, the trial for the suspected radicals netted in the Tulsa 
IWW raids began. In sworn testimony, one IWW member named Johnson, who spoke in 
broken English, had only arrived in Tulsa three days earlier with just a penny in his 
pocket, and hoped to find a job soon. Five detectives appeared to testify, and all 
maintained that the headquarters of the Wobblies held a reputation as being a place where 
men congregated to "defeat the aims of the government."
26
 The prosecution asked the 
members of the union if their organization sanctioned the violent actions featured in 
many strikes staged by the IWW, but the Tulsa World reported that their answers came 
concealed in sarcasm. Regarding the reputation of the headquarters, the prosecution 
queried members of the union, who all spoke in broken English and responded that they 
thought the place exceedingly orderly.
27
 During cross-examination, one IWW member 
spoke of the increasing prices and low wages, prompting persons in the courtroom to 
burst into applause. After the outburst, the judged warned he would arrest anyone who 
applauded thereafter.
28
 On November 9, prosecutors rested their case based on the 
defendants' IWW membership. Police failed to prove their guilt in the bomb attack on 
Pew; however, the judge found the members guilty of not owning Liberty Bonds to 
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support the war effort, in addition to vagrancy. Similarly, authorities arrested five defense 
witnesses for the same offense, finding them guilty. The court fined all the men $100, and 
the judge concluded that "these are no ordinary times."
29
  
Persecution of Wobblies continued throughout the year, and in Drumright federal 
agents invaded the local IWW hall in November and raided the office of a sympathetic 
attorney. In a subsequent raid, agents smashed furniture and windows of a local hall, 
arresting members for vagrancy.
30
 The local government used the excuse of a storage 
tank explosion in Cushing, blaming the IWW for it, and also accused the group of 
planning attacks on troop trains.
31
 Storage tank explosions and fires in the oil fields 
remained a constant danger, though more often from lightning strikes than sabotage. 
Drumright even kept a cannon on standby to shoot holes in the tanks to release oil should 
a fire occur.
32
 The increased tension and fear from the war provided authorities with the 
perfect opportunity however, allowing them to rid themselves and their resources from 
the threat of the radical Wobblies once and for all.  
On November 9, shortly after the Tulsa trial ended, policemen loaded seventeen 
prisoners into three automobiles for transportation to the county jail. At 11:00 PM that 
night, a crowd of roughly fifty men in long black robes and masks stopped the vehicles, 
and diverted them to a secluded area where they lashed each prisoner with a cat-o'-nine-
tails. They then applied a coat of hot tar to the bleeding backs of the men, and applied 
feathers to conclude their work. The robed vigilantes belonged to the Knights of Liberty, 
an organization dedicated to expunging anti-American sentiment from the country.  One 
witness reported that with each strike of the instrument, a black-robed man in charge of 




Another observer told of an old man who pleaded for mercy, explaining that he had lived 
in Oklahoma for 18 years, raised a large family, and was not a member of the IWW. An 
individual in the party remembered his arrest at the union headquarters, however, and the 
mob gave the man no quarter.
34
 After the ceremony, the Knights of Liberty forced the 
men, wearing nothing but their trousers, into the Osage hills, firing hundreds of rifle and 
revolver shots in their direction, causing the victims to flee "with the speed of 
kangaroos." One "knight" yelled at the fleeing men "let this be a warning to all IWW's to 
never come to Tulsa again! Now get!" The Tulsa World surmised that the plot remained a 
carefully planned operation, indicated by the machine-like precision of its execution.
35
 
Other scholars, such as Sellars, postulated that the police actually aided in the mob action, 
and that the Knights of Liberty received their weaponry from the Tulsa Home Guard.
36
 
This action, later called the "Tulsa Outrage" by the Wobbly community, inspired 
even more serious action against suspected radicals. That same day, Muskogee suffered 
serious fires when their cotton gin storehouse burned to the ground. Three other fires 
accompanied it, and while harboring no proof, authorities immediately blamed the IWW 
for starting the blazes. The Sapulpa cotton gin, the oldest and largest in Creek County, 
also suffered from a severe fire which eventually destroyed the structure. Losses from 
both events came to over $275,000, and with the recent publicized persecution of the 
Wobblies, citizens appeared anxious for more. Newspapers quickly hyped the events, 
with the Tulsa World telling of an alleged IWW member arrested by police who knew 
how to create quick-acting poisons that could not be detected in the body after death.
37
 
The public widely supported the vigilante actions upon radicals, and the Tulsa World 
reported that Oklahomans buzzed with excitement in reaction to the actions performed by 
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the Knights of Liberty. "Everyone talked about the incident and everyone seemed to 
approve of the actions that had been taken. There seemed to be a feeling 'in the air' that 
the 'Knights of Liberty' would be heard from again."
38
  
The recent and much-publicized actions against the Wobblies caused even more 
instances of vigilantism against the group, with similar measures occurring elsewhere to 
drive the organization out of the state. Reports from Guthrie indicated that two victims of 
the tar and feathering arrived, boarded a train and fled the state. In Drumright and 
Bartlesville, among other towns, authorities and vigilantes arrested and ran out other 
IWW members. The Tulsa World reported that the Knights of Liberty "have apparently 
started a movement that will lead to the breaking up of the organization in the Oklahoma 
oil fields and prevent the strike that they have threatened for some time."
39
 Across the 
state, citizens and officials attributed any major act of violence to the IWW. In Henryetta 
that year, a local newspaper blamed a passenger train wreck to the organization. Evidence 
later exonerated the Wobblies, pointing instead to a metal machine part left on the track 
by children. The newspaper refused to retract, arguing that such an action remained 
consistent with IWW tactics.
40
 
By Fall 1917, war hysteria caused the public to accept the extra-legal persecution 
of dissent. The tide against radical labor turned sharply, and authorities systematically 
dismantled the IWW in Oklahoma and across the nation, convincing many members to 
abandon its ranks. On November 12, the Tulsa World reported a major success against 
radicalism and explained that the Tulsa Outrage convinced one member of the Wobblies 
to quit from the organization. The paper proclaimed that the Knights of Liberty "made a 
believer" out of at least one IWW who was flogged, tarred and feathered that night, 
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giving a solid backing to this method of conversion. In a telephone conversation with the 
local sheriff, the former Wobbly pleaded to go back to work, and only desired an 
opportunity to return to Tulsa and show the people he was no longer a member of the 
IWW. The sheriff responded, telling the man he could come back as long as he was 
convinced that the US government did not need the advice or active rebellion of the 
radical organization.
41
 Police later arrested a man outside the city jail, and later found 
IWW literature on him and a copy of a newspaper detailing the harsh methods of the 
Knights of Liberty. Officers had no evidence, but held the opinion that he planned some 
retaliatory act before they caught him.
42
 
Incriminating news against radical labor appeared in torrents, and on November 
14, local newspapers in Tulsa reported a theft of high-yield explosives with enough force 
to blow up the entire business district of the city. The paper told of missing nitroglycerin, 
twenty sticks of dynamite, and fuse caps. This occurred during the nationwide coal 
mining strike that severely affected the state and increased tensions against labor groups 
and rumored Bolshevist conspiracies. Reportedly, mine operators immediately believed 
the IWW was behind the theft. One mine employee said that the robbers knew how to use 
the materials, and they "either wanted to do some shooting for another company or... get 
rid of some buildings and people who stand in their way."
43
 Other instances dogged the 
state, and on November 16, newspapers reported another instance attributed to the 
Wobblies. Sources indicated that they blew up a major gasoline plant in Payne County 
operated by the Standard Oil Company of Indiana. In a letter sent to the sheriff of 
Pontotoc County from a person identified only as "A Member," an individual provided 
details of a meeting between the IWW and Working Class Union where they laid out 
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plans for destroying troop trains, murdering officers, and destruction of property. The 
purported member of the group who sent the letter explained that he had quit the 
organization, and they would kill him if they found he informed on them. He said that he 
betrayed them for "the people's sake," and told authorities to look out for sabotage. The 
Tulsa World claimed that threat of the IWW had Oklahoma "sleeping with one eye open 
and a finger on the trigger," evidenced by a recent shooting of a Wobbly by the chief of 
police in Sapulpa.
44
 After an investigation into the causes of the explosion of the gasoline 
plant, authorities disproved the idea of IWW involvement.
45
 The actions against the 
radical labor union provoked a positive response from the populace, and also caused a 
great amount of alarm from its leadership.  
The union attempted to investigate these matters, and sent nine-year veteran 
Wencil Francik to Oklahoma on November 16. Within five hours of his arrival in Tulsa, a 
local detective placed him under arrest and forced a confession out of him of being a 
prime mover in radical labor activities in the state. After authorities escorted Francik to 
the station, he claimed that all he desired to do was to find out what "Americans of Tulsa 
are going to do about the treatment given the members of the IWW in this city."
46
 Further 
examples of the paranoid mentality that featured so prominent during the First Red Scare 
occurred when on November 19, the Tulsa World reported on a wild rumor from 
Shawnee that IWW members had dynamited the city jail there, killing twenty-nine people. 
The town sent back a reply stating "rumor erroneous. No destruction here and better not 
be." The newspaper applauded the firm showing of spirit in the reply, and attributed such 
determination as the reason no instances of destruction occurred in the past several 
days.
47
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As authorities and vigilante groups continued in their dismantling of the IWW, 
the radical union's efforts in the oil fields ground to a halt. The foundations of paranoia 
laid during the war years remained however, and by the time of the First Red Scare in 
1919, manifested itself in a number of alarmist articles. In one example, newspapers 
exaggerated reports of a telephone strike in neighboring Drumright, claiming that 
Bolshevist elements had fomented violence in their sister city.
48
 The Cushing Citizen, 
reported in dire terms the state of the nation, portraying every strike as an attempt to 
destroy constitutional authority.
49
 The Cushing Citizen also refused to call communists by 
their name, instead referring to them by the slang term "reds" and "anarchists."
50
  
By 1919, authorities, media, and the populace fully completed the foundations allowing 
for the First Red Scare mentality to thrive in Oklahoma. The state, with its history of 
socialist agitation, anti-draft movements, and labor struggles over resources appeared 
poised to react to any disturbance. The IWW was crushed as it tried to make in-roads in 
eastern Oklahoma, and the population remained drummed up with hysteria over 
suspected saboteurs, radical agents, and communists. While the Wobblies were indeed a 
far-left revolutionary organization, this did not give state and local officials the right to 
ruthlessly persecute them. Oftentimes, the media, judges, and the civilian population 
would disregard laws and decency itself to harass members of the IWW, whether they 
had committed a crime or not. The Tulsa Outrage remains a potent symbol on the dangers 
of illogical paranoia as it illustrates the depths that frightened people would go to protect 
themselves against supposed threats. All of these elements of fear and suppression would 
come to a head by 1919 with further labor disputes occurring in the east in Muskogee, 
Drumright, and other places. Coupled with the irrational fear and threats to resources, 
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events that year would propel Oklahoma into the darkest reaches of the First Red Scare, 
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Chapter 4: Strikes in Eastern Oklahoma and the Drumright Affair, 1919 
 As Oklahoma entered 1919, the state plunged headlong into the First Red Scare, 
joining the rest of the nation in fear and paranoia. The Seattle strike in January and the 
anarchist bombing campaign in April rocked the country, with worry exacerbated over an 
imminent communist coup. Thrown into the mix were Oklahoma's growing labor 
problems, with disturbances increasing in frequency and volatility. Overreaction and 
harsh persecution of the IWW put the state on edge and increased panic over attacks on 
the oil-rich region. Muskogee, Tulsa, and later the town of Drumright, located near the 
rich Cushing-Drumright oil field, would experience their own series of troubles as 
workers demanded improved conditions from business owners. Amidst the full-blown 
paranoia of the First Red Scare, authorities, media, and the populace reacted illogically, 
yet in a manner wholly consistent with the rest of the nation. These groups construed 
efforts at renegotiation as dangerous and un-American, threatening the vital services and 
resources of the state.  
 The Drumright strike especially represented what the First Red Scare was all 
about. Originally consisting of a group of harmless striking telephone operators, the 
demonstration turned into one night of minor lawlessness with no serious damage or 
injuries reported after an unknown individual discharged a weapon. Overblown reports 
rang out across the nation portraying the event as a major riot and a Bolshevist 
conspiracy to overthrow the government. By the end of the event, the national guard 
occupied the town, faulty reports of communist conspiracy thrust Drumright into national 
headlines, and Oklahomans received a major taste of what the First Red Scare was all 
about. The Drumright affair represents a key pillar in Oklahoma's disturbing journey 
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through the First Red Scare. While exact details may never be known, the event, along 
with the other strikes in Eastern Oklahoma, stand as warnings against overreaction and 
the dangers of people succumbing to paranoia and fear. 
 Shortly after the nationwide bomb attacks in May 1919, a disturbance occurred in 
the eastern Oklahoma town of Muskogee when the Muskogee Central Labor Union and 
Building Trade Council supported a strike by the Street Car Men's Union. Authorities 
immediately attempted to settle the strike by force, resulting in a near riot.
1
 After six 
weeks of wrangling, the mayor of the city endorsed a plan of arbitration, raising the fare 
to put the Muskogee Electric Traction Company in a position to pay an advance in wages 
and improve their equipment and services for the workers. The company later selected 
four men to represent them in negotiations.
2
 Talks broke down once more, dragging the 
situation into August. A lawyer working on reconciling the two sides later wrote a letter 
to Robertson, conveying the general despair by the owners as well as the mayor of 
Muskogee. The company maintained that they remained ready, able and willing to 
proceed with the operation of cars and would gladly permit the men to return to work and 
settle questions by arbitration.  Bringing up the economic inequalities in the post-war 
period, the lawyer opined that he saw no hope for any solution of labor troubles until 
"there has been a substantial reduction in the cost of living, and it must be conceded that 
the great price of all commodities is somewhat of an excuse for the increased demands 
for pay." He also concluded "if the ninety per cent of those who suffer will organize 
against the ten percent of those who are profiteering it seems to me that in a very short 




 Efforts at reconciliation continued, and the board of arbitration finally reached a 
settlement. This lasted for all of a week before the men decided to strike once more. The 
central labor union of Muskogee later spearheaded an investigation and succeeded in 
obtaining further concessions from the company. The union men of the city approved of 
the contract, but the president of the carmen's union Jess Green repudiated labor's action 
by refusing to go back to work. Labor leaders then voted on August 17 to withdraw 
support from the street car union, at which time members outside the union agreed to 
operate the cars.
4
 By August 23, the Daily Oklahoman declared that the street car strike 
was lost, as the Central Labor Union, the backbone of support for the workers, withdrew 
its support after car men refused to go back to work following concessions by the 
company. During the strike, authorities signed in one thousand members of the citizens 
committee to protect the cars during non-union operation.
5
 The street car company later 
agreed to reorganize the union and put the men back to work if they elected new officers. 
After a month of operation by non-union men, the Muskogee street car strike situation 
improved further. On September 26, the Muskogee Carmen's Union did just that and fired 
Jesse Green, president, and G.W. Ritchie, secretary, electing their replacements.
6
 
Eventually both sides reconciled, and street car service resumed in Muskogee. While both 
sides resolved the matter peacefully, the event illustrated the dangerous territory striking 
workers embarked upon in the new social climate. This prolonged action by the union at 
first resulted in a near riot, and newspapers reported negatively on the strikers. Other 
labor disputes appeared across the state, prompting local authorities to appeal for greater 
measures taken against strikers. 
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 On August 8, concurrent with the Muskogee strike, Tulsa policemen walked out 
protesting for shorter hours and higher pay, a matter evaded by commissioners for over a 
month. The officers stated that they were not asking for recognition of their newly 
formed union, as in the Boston police strike, but instead asked for a raise from $110 a 
month to $125 for patrolmen and $150 for drivers and others, and an eight-hour day 
instead of a twelve-hour day. The city commissioners declared that they were unable to 
settle these demands, as the city lacked sufficient funds to grant the pay increase. The 
policemen countered stating that "there seemed to be sufficient funds a month ago to 
raise the salaries of men in all the other city departments." Newspapers categorized the 
strike as a major threat, stating that they left the city "without protection from the 
numerous thugs and holdups."
7
 The absentee workers asked Robertson to send a 
company of the state militia to guard the city in their absence until they reached a 
settlement. Police Commissioner F.M. Bohn ordered all men to turn in their guns and 
badges, and planned on calling out the reserves to take charge. The Daily Oklahoman 
commented warily "just what the reserves are is a subject for some speculation among 
Tulsa citizens." The act spread alarm across the city, with countless citizens stocking up 
on weapons and ammunition.
8
 
 While Governor Robertson considered appeals for national guard intervention, the 
police commissioner made every effort to recruit returning soldiers to duty in protecting 
the city along with plainclothes officers who refused to walk out. By August 11 however, 
five soldiers employed in guard duty walked out after a number of striking policemen 
called them "scabs" and told them they took bread out of babies' mouths.
9
 Harkening to 
the anti-radical sentiment common in the Red Scare, important officials including former 
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US District Judge Ralph Campbell called the striking policemen traitors and deserters, 
and said they should be punished as such.
10
 On August 21, Joseph Meyer, labor 
conciliator for the federal government, received orders directly from Washington 
instructing him to proceed to Tulsa to conduct an inquiry into the difference between the 
police union and the city.
11
 Robertson refused the demands of the union, and stood fast 
against acceding to their requests. During the crisis, the governor utilized former Deputy 
US Marshal Chris Madsen to investigate the situation. He traveled to Tulsa on August 13, 
and met with the mayor and several striking policemen with whom he was acquainted 
with. He discovered that a major had not been in favor of the strike, but were led into 
joining by radicals with "smooth talk and fine promises." After finding little help from 
the populace and the city administration, most were willing to return to their old jobs if 
they could be granted enough of their demands to save face. Madsen told that no 
demonstration of sympathy for the police occurred during a Labor Day parade, even 
though several of the strikers marched. Of the twenty-eight patrolmen who went on strike, 
sixteen returned on September 1, assigned to duty on probation for sixty days an granted 
a pay increase of $15 per month. Officials denied their demand for shorter hours and 
recognition of their union.
12
 Madsen reported that authorities reinstated Ed Hahn, 
president of the union, though he refused to walk the beat assigned to him or take orders 
from the sergeant. They promptly fired him fifteen minutes after going to work. The 
informant gave much credit to the city administration for their handling of the situation, 
as they prevented a serious condition had they joined or encouraged the strikers.
13
  
 The tough stance taken by local officials forced policemen to cancel their strike 
with less than what they hoped for, and the two parties eventually reconciled and settled 
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the strike, bringing back order to the city. The events of the First Red Scare in eastern 
Oklahoma proved that radical agitation surrounding labor and business interests remained 
strong, and followed along national lines in levels of severity. A far great disturbance 
would occur in the sleepy town of Drumright, located near the robust oil fields, standing 
as one of the two major overreactions the state experienced during the First Red Scare. 
In late 1919, a local event occurred that epitomized the First Red Scare and the 
paranoid attitudes surrounding it. On September 22, as a group of striking female 
telephone operators demonstrated peacefully in the sleepy town of Drumright. During the 
march down main street, an unidentified individual fired off a gun, causing supporters of 
the strikers and the local police force to engage in a brief scuffle. There were no injuries, 
with only two shots fired in the air, and by the next day the trouble had ended. Later, after 
an intense investigation, a governor appointed State Board of Arbitration determined that 
there was no proof of IWW involvement or major violence. Initial reports told a far 
different and highly sensationalized story, with initial associated press telegrams telling 
of serious violence, and a mob that rounded up the mayor and law enforcement officers 
demanding their resignation. By the end of the event, the national guard occupied 
Drumright to "restore order," the local newspaper engaged in a feud with the Tulsa World 
over the latter's negative portrayal of the town, and false tales of a Bolshevist conspiracy 
flooded the national media.  
The buildup to the incident offered little indication of the dramatic series of 
events that would follow. In the sleepy town of Drumright, situated near the eastern oil 
fields of the state, the worries of Bolshevik uprisings appeared far off. On September 2, a 
Labor Day parade occurred without incident as labor organizers, pastors, judges and 
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citizens gathered to celebrate the holiday.
14
 The local newspaper, the Drumright Derrick, 
took a casual approach to labor disturbances occurring in other parts of the state. A strike 
in Shawnee by telephone operators was met with relaxed undertones by the Derrick, with 
the outlet reporting on ongoing mediation and possible reconciliation.
15
 Another report 
told in little threatening language that police killed some strikers and wounded fifteen in a 
battle between law enforcement and employees of the Standard Stock Car Company.
16
 
Drumright soon approached their own troubles, as local operators later threatened phone 
service across the town. A report circulated before the walkout that phone service was 
inadequate. Heralding an early warning of the event, the article pointed out that “Here in 
Drumright, we are told, that much of this inefficiency of service is due to poor equipment, 
a lack of modern facilities and too much work being placed on a few operators, long 
hours and low pay for the operators.”
17
 A pattern of overworked and underpaid workers 
appeared, as demand skyrocketed, with 200 more phones desired by the town.
18
  
On Saturday, September 20, eighteen out of twenty-one female telephone workers 
of the Southwestern Bell Company went on strike.
19
 The workers demanded recognition 
of their organization, better hours and pay, and received support from the Drumright 
Trades’ Assembly, which represented every union in the town.
20
 The women 
demonstrated the rising tide in female activism that became a staple during the early 
1900s. While barred from outright participation in politics through voting, they 
nonetheless took matters into their own hands and championed for their own rights 
against a company dominated by men. The telephone operators later conditionally went 
back to work pending a decision from the State Board of Arbitration.
21
 The town kept 
relatively calm during the event, and the Derrick reported that the strikers were “very 
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quiet,” and that they were "quietly abiding the decisions of the company and are not 
making any demonstrations.”
22
 Several workers put out statements regarding the 




On September 22, the Drumright Strike took a turn for the worse. The telephone 
operators were conducting a demonstration in the middle of town with several hundred 
sympathizers when, as  the Derrick explained the following day, "some kid with a 
howitzer about as big as himself took a shot at one of the policemen and when the 
attempt was made to arrest the kid the riot started."
24
 When police attempted to arrest the 
youth, the strike supports and law enforcement squared off. The newspaper reported that 
some over-zealous sympathizers took Police Chief Jack Ary into custody, disarmed him 
and made him promise to resign his office. The Derrick reported  that "good natured Jack 
didn't seem to be very badly scared, neither did he resign from the office."
25
 The 
newspaper humorously stated that "with all the excitement there was no serious 
disturbances and no one was hurt, but it was bully fun while it lasted and there were 
many who thought that there would be rioting and killing."
26
 It proclaimed that the only 
serious side of the trouble appeared the next morning when twenty special officers 
appeared on the streets armed with Winchesters, intent on keeping a wary eye on all who 
had the appearance of making trouble.
27
 Unfortunately for Drumright, the brief brush 
with violence coincided with the nationwide steel strike that affected thousands of union 
workers. The striking ladies quickly and permanently took a back seat to the developing 
story, as US newspapers categorized the major walkout as a coup masterminded by 
radical labor and communist supporters who intended on overthrowing the government.  
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News of the outburst spread far and wide across a nation already gripped by the 
fear of Bolshevism, with many papers choosing to escalate the hysteria. Harlow’s Weekly 
characterized the event as “The first serious attempt to dethrone constituted authority by 
mob law.”
28
 They stated that authorities believed the IWW and bolshevist elements 
perpetrated the so called riot, despite a signed statement from unions and the striking 
telephone women that organized labor held no support for the outburst.
29
 The same day 
the Derrick printed its version of events, the national media took hold of the story  and 
reported on the exaggerated events based off the faulty associated press reports. 
Hundreds of miles away in Mississippi, the Biloxi Daily Herald declared that "mob 
members assume control of Oklahoma Town: law and order apparently thrown to the 
wind in Drumright as result of telephone strike."
30
 They reported the unsuccessful 
attempts to reach Drumright, citing a mob taking over the wires.  The Herald also 
brought up the town's choice location in oil rich Creek County, and told of reports stating 
a mob drove the police department from the city and assumed control, disarming the 
chief of police and threatening his life if he did not resign. They mentioned an 
unconfirmed report from Oilton that stated a group was attempting to burn the Bell 
telephone building down at Drumright.
31
 The Herald further claimed that not only had 
the majority of police been driven out and the police chief threatened with death, and the 
telephone building threatened with destruction, but three women operators who refused to 
strike were reportedly held prisoner by the mob in the telephone building where their 
friends were refused admittance or the right to supply them with food. The paper clarified 
that the trouble supposedly started when a policemen clubbed a picketer that morning.
 32
 
From as far away as rural Wyoming, news of the Drumright affair made front-page news. 
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With an entire section devoted to strikes and disturbances across the country, the 
telephone strike made headlines, with the Wyoming State Tribune stating "Oklahomans 
shoot up streets and otherwise conduct themselves scandalously."
33
 They further claimed 
that a mob detained Mayor W.E. Nicodemus, Councilman Barter, and Chief of Police 
Jack Ary, but later released them that same day.
 34
 
The event made headlines in countless other newspapers across the country, From 
Idaho where an outlet trumped up the foreign influence of the riot, to Michigan, New 
Mexico, and Ohio. Stories told of how one individual, a union leader named Ed Welch, 
led oil field workers on a rampage.
35
 Welch would later be one of the few individuals 
actually convicted of inciting a riot, though he received a light sentence. One 
uncharacteristically calm portrayal of events came from the Lexington Herald, which 
reported that that the town was "perfectly quiet." It said that "there were no deaths, no 
hospital cases and no property damage," and that after the telephone operators went on 
strike, "considerable feeling developed in the community and there was some disorder, in 
the course of which two harmless shots were fired."
36
 The newspaper elaborated that the 
first shot was aimed at Henry Carlos, assistant chief of police, who was on guard at the 
telephone office in front of the mob-like crowd. City Commissioner John Baxter seized 
the assailant's weapon and fired a second shot in the perpetrator's direction. Far from 
being detained by a group of angry Bolsheviks, the paper claimed that Chief of Police 
John Ary  escaped the crowd and made his way to neighboring Cushing, where he 
signaled alarm and returned with three deputy sheriffs.  
Apparently, city officials insisted that political opponents of the mayor who 




 This ran counter to the national tendency to sensationalize, 
with most papers printing stories similar to the Tucson Citizen, which told of IWW 
involvement in the riots.
 38
 It went on to say that Nicodemus made a statement linking 
Bolshevist and IWW elements among the oil field workers, again repeating the 
sensationalist line fed by the mayor.
 39
 Papers that reported in dire tones about the issue 
were among the first to introduce notions of the closeness of the event to the nation's vital 
resources, and the ethnic makeup of those committing the lawless acts, and were also 
prone to exaggeration. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, for its part, linked the oil richness of 
the area with the day's outburst in its article, repeated the story that one of the 
perpetrators came from Germany, harkening back to World War I fears of infiltration.
40
 
Reasons for the sensationalist reporting dates back to the troubles the oil-rich 
region in eastern Oklahoma discussed in the previous chapter. Keenly aware that the 
IWW played a large role in the area historically, reporters took no chances in assuming 
the Wobblies played a large role in the Drumright affair. Despite authorities crushing the 
union at the end of the war, the historical experience from 1917 and the year prior helped 
thrust the media and populace into a panic that the organization had returned in some 
form to exact revenge. 
The Drumright Derrick condemned the Associated Press, which irresponsibly 
sent out exaggerated telegrams to dozens of other newspapers.
41
 On September 23, the 
same day news outlets across the country told of anarchist rule, the Derrick explained 
that “There is no mob and there has been no semblance of one. However, there are 
millions of people throughout the country who are hearing of Drumright… who would 
probably never know the town existed.”
42
 It called the Associated Press releases 
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sensationalist pieces that maintained no regard for the truth.
43
  The Derrick also 
attempted to bring clarity to the situation, saying that "there has been no attempt to 
destroy property. Chief of Police Ary and Mayor Nicodemus have not disappeared and 
the Chief of Police has been attending to his duties as usual today. Mayor Nicodemus is 
well and hearty and smiling."
44
 The editor for the Derrick, obviously outraged by the 
faulty reporting, printed a direct rebuttal against the Tulsa World, saying that their stories 
were a "misrepresentation of fact, in other words, it is a story manufactured out of the 
vivid imagination of some one who wants to resort to sensationalism and such a 
statement as appears in that paper of this morning only lends to inflame an element that is 
always inflamable[sic]."
45
 The feud between the two newspapers escalated, as the World 
would later print their own counterargument. In the meantime, officials attempted to keep 
the situation calm. On September 23, the union president of the Drumright central Trades 
and Labor Council H.M. Boyle requested that there be no mass meetings that might 
disrupt law and order, and instructed all union affiliates to that effect.
 
 Lois Reenh and Ina 
Woods, representing the striking telephone operators also put out a statement, requesting 
their friends and sympathizers to in no way or manner cause any disturbances on the 
streets and not to make demonstrations that would cause trouble, owing to the false 
reports that had went out of the town.
 46
 
That same day, however, Governor Robertson took action that severely 
undermined the attempts at normalcy during the Red Scare. He sent in the national guard 
to quell the supposed revolt adding further fuel to the erupting firestorm.
47
 Under orders 
from Robertson, Adjutant General Charles Barrett and roughly 200 soldiers from 
Companies H, I, M, G, Supply, 2nd Infantry, and Companies B and D 1st Separate 
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Battalion, fully armed and equipped, marched intro Drumright.
48
 Barrett informed the 
governor that night that intelligence showed the situation as "extremely dangerous," and 




During and after the incident, descriptions tended to play up the severe nature of 
the disturbance. Most histories of the event portray the affair as a serious threat and that a 
large, threatening mob actually existed and did detain the local mayor and police chief. 
Articles, newspapers, and recollections from the commander of the national guard all 
corroborate the sensationalist point of view. Nevertheless, according to various primary 
sources, no such dramatic event occurred. While there was undoubtedly some kind of a 
disturbance in Drumright, many news outlets in the state and nation succumbed to the 
illogical fears of the First Red Scare, and sensationalized the event. Throughout the 
papers of the day, alarmist stories of communist disturbances prevailed, giving rise to the 
unease and overreaction that characterized the period. Article titles included “Red Troops 
are Nearing Capital,”
50
 in reference to the Bolshevist victories in Russia, and “Riots and 
Disorder Prevail in the East.”
51
 News stories carried further headlines incriminating strike 
leaders in the national steel strike as radical members of the IWW.
52
 Whether large scale 
violence in the town appeared or not, the Derrick took a positive view of National Guard 
troops entering. It stated that “The authorities backed by every peace loving citizen stand 
behind the troops and are backing them up in the effort to see that law and order is 
maintained and that a repetition of Monday night’s trouble is not repeated.”
53
 The 
newspaper went on to state that “violators will be severely dealt with. This is a country of 
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free speech but free speech does not consist of allowing… agitator[s] to inflame the 
lawless and incite them to acts of violence.”
54
  
Authorities initially arrested nine suspects in connection with the disturbance, and 
according to a Sapulpa dispatch two of the men “are alleged to have been sent to the 
United States from Germany by the Bolsheviki element for the purpose of inciting unrest 
in this country.”
55
 Harlow's Weekly portrayed the action by protestors as revenge against 
Drumright’s mayor, who achieved victory over a socialist challenger in the previous 
election, and the telephone strike was used as a means of embarrassing and overthrowing 
the administration.
56
 Trumping up alarmist calls of revolution, the newspaper also 
mentioned that “Whatever the underlying cause of the Drumright disturbance may be, the 
fact stands out in bold relief that it was the first serious attempt in Oklahoma to substitute 
mob rule for constituted authority and thus the situation calls for the most careful 
consideration. Good citizens were thoroughly aroused and brought to a realization that 
the bolshevist element, although doubtless in a hopeless minority, is attempting to rear its 
head in Oklahoma.”
57
 In a piece written for Harlow’s Weekly by Orville Hall, he said that 
developments with the disturbances in Drumright “have removed all doubts that the 
disturbance was caused by the IWW or bolshevist element.”
58
 Hall claimed that 
bolshevist elements used the telephone strike as an opportunity to unseat the government 
and that that while some initial reports appeared overblown, criticisms of Robertson’s 
handling of the situation remained unfair. He maintained that the troops sent by the 





The situation remained at a standstill between operators and Southwestern Bell, 
though the citizens of Drumright appeared indignant at the false reports sent out to the 
nation. Practically every citizen in the city supported the striking women, and the Derrick 
held that their newspaper was "for the girls and as their demands are within reason, and 
should be granted, we hope that the telephone company can be made to see that their 
claims should be granted.”
60
 The Derrick went on to say that the early reports sent out 
that escalated the hysteria resulted in much damage to the city. “In so far as the 
statements of rioting and destruction of property is concerned each and every one is a 
point blank lie and the man or men who sent them to the press associations are barefaced 
liars as every citizen in Drumright knows. There has been not one single man, woman or 
child hurt or injured and aside from the fact that some one threw a rock through the sign 
of the Southwestern Bell telephone Co.’s sign, there has not been five cents worth of 
damage done to any property in the city.”
61
 Countering the Derrick's earlier reports and 
attacks on their journalistic integrity, the Tulsa World printed a rebuttal on September 25, 
after troops had "restored order" in the town.  
On September 25, the Tulsa World printed a scathing editorial on the entire affair, 
allowing fears of Bolshevism to override the common sense coming from the Derrick. It 
told its readers that if one wanted to know the true situation in the town, then one needed 
to go to Drumright and talk to the people. They claimed that while initial reports of the 
rioting were exaggerated, the causes leading up to it "must be written in terms of red card 
Socialists and Bolsheviki and terrorism."
62
 They labeled the event a reign of terror by 
radicals, and painted one of the suspects, Ed Welch, as a radical extremist and even an 
IWW member. The World told that from his jail cell, Welch admitted as much, and that 
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he and the element he represented did not like the way the local government had 
conducted itself during the strike. The article went on to say that the instigator's intention 
was to force Mayor Nicodemus and Councilman Baxter and the chief of police to resign. 
The suspect denied that the mob had used violence though, and that he merely wanted the 
officials out of office.
63
  
To support their credibility, the World mentioned that there was an active IWW 
organization in Drumright, which routinely agitated for membership. The newspaper 
maintained 1,195 Wobblies still resided in the town, and that they were the one's 
responsible for the recent affair.
64
 The news outlet characterized the situation as a fight 
between radical and conservative elements, and became bitter especially during the last 
city election. "It was so intense that the ordinary political lines were wiped out and the 
contest for office was fought out in the lines of the conservatives against the radicals."
65
 
Nicodemus headed one ticket, while a radical, chosen by Welch, headed the other. 
Eventually, the town elected Nicodemus, which created a near final obstruction for the 
leftists, that eventually culminated in the lawlessness of September 22. The paper went 
on to say that the telephone strike was a minor matter and had nothing to do with the 
demonstration, "it merely provided an excuse."
66
 The article concluded that  
upon the head of Welch is heaped bitter condemnation. He is the man who 
organized the Oil Field Workers Union. He is the business secretary of the 
organization. He does no work except to look after the affairs of the union. 
He has lived in Drumright several years and bears the reputation of an 
'extremist.' There are some who call him a Socialist and one of the 
officials of the central trades union declared that he is an IWW by 




Welch later denied these accusations, and emphatically said that he refused to consider 
any application to his union if he knew he was a member of the IWW. Welch called 
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himself a pacifist by nature and opposed all violence. He maintained that he prevented 
the lynching of the chief of police, and persuaded mob members not to burn down 
Councilman Baxter's home. Of the 150-200 men that composed the mob, with 1,500-
2,000 onlookers lining the streets, Welch mentioned that he was involved, but issued a 
complete denial of any physical part in the demonstrations, though he was part of a group 
that desired members of the administration to resign.  
 The Tulsa rebuttal, directly contradicting the Derrick, also reiterated that the mob 
had indeed disarmed the police and threatened his life unless he left town. The chief, not 
wanting to become a martyr, decided to feign agreement and fled to Cushing where he 
sent out calls for help. The newspaper claimed he was later joined by other officers and 
Baxter, who escaped the scene in an automobile. The mayor stayed off the streets and 
sent out calls to the governor's office asking for troops to be sent, and upon hearing 
affidavits describing the event, Robertson agreed. Purportedly, a band of 300 oil workers 
intended to come in on September 23 to finish the job begun by the mob, and upon 
finding out, officials deputized over 100 citizens to defend the streets.
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 Labor unions denied responsibility for the event and offered to supply their men 
for patrol duty. Citizens expected the small army of radical oil workers to invade, and, as 
the World attested, reasons why no such event occurred was not known, though they 
suggested it was due to a false report in the first place. It later chalked up the lack of 
appearance to the arrival of the troops, who deterred any would-be invader. The World 
warned how seriously near Drumright came to anarchy, and that "it was not only a riot 
that was stopped in Drumright Monday night. Bolshevism in an aggravated form has 
been squelched and now energies are being turned toward wiping it out."
69
 In the wake of 
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troops arriving, few newspapers attempted retractions. One exception appeared in the 
Colorado Springs Gazette, which called the riots "greatly magnified."
70
 This remained a 
unique example, as most outlets opted to continue the hysteria. 
 The reporting by the newspapers did considerable harm to the image of Drumright, 
and Governor Robertson attempted to repair the town, and by extension the state's image. 
He contacted Earl Foster, the County Attorney for Creek County on September 25, and 
said that the disturbance at Drumright incurred great expense to the state and gave it 
exceedingly undesirable notoriety. He called on the attorney to prosecute all those guilty 
of perpetrating the riots, and expected officers of Creek County to "spare no effort in 
bringing about the immediate arrest, prosecution, and punishment of the offenders." He 
offered to give the attorney all the assistance in his power to support the investigation, 
and stated that he had directed the attorney general to make a special investigation of the 
matter.
71
 To that end, he sent a letter to the attorney general, telling him, if necessary, to 
call a grand jury, and to "kindly use all the machinery of your office looking to the 
immediate arrest, prosecution and punishment of those guilty."
72
  
 Judge Lucien Wright, representing the county attorney's office, responded to the 
governor's letter. He offered his assurances that they remained busy in procuring 
evidence for the preliminary hearing of those arrested, and also said that he was away 
from the county at the time of the occurrence and all knowledge he had of the event was 
from hearsay. Nevertheless, he vowed to assist Robertson in his crusade against the 
trouble-makers of Drumright.
73
 Mayor Nicodemus for his part, appeared more than 
willing to assist in the investigation, and offered profound thanks to the governor for 
sending in troops. Despite earlier claims from the Derrick that nothing of note happened 
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during the riot, and that the mayor was not in any danger, Nicodemus stated that since the 
county attorney and sheriff were away the night of the event, they were unable to "fully 
realize the seriousness of the situation."
74
 A complete statement of the situation was sent 
to the Governor on September 26 asking him for arbitration.
75
 
 By September 27, authorities released a majority of the men arrested as they had 
posted their bail bonds.
76
 Judge Gaylord Wilcox, of the superior court of Creek County, 
sent a letter to Robertson explained that authorities had indicted twelve men in all, and 
that the real trouble stemmed from the war. He told how local officers had to deal with 
the IWW and socialists, and the revolutionary element in the oil field, "where there are 
thousands of men employed, more than any other place in this state." He reiterated the 
Tulsa World's influential article rebutting the Derrick, and  after a failed bid for electoral 
power running, radicals took the opportunity of the striking ladies to exact revenge. He 
praised Robertson exceedingly for his decision to send in troops, saying that "the best 
possible thing and the only proper thing, in my judgment, under the conditions, was to do 
just exactly what you did."
77
  
That same day phone service resumed in Drumright, though none of the operators 
on strike went back to work.
78
 By October, law enforcement officials rounded up and 
indicted sixteen men for rioting, with all but two able to make bail.
79
 Later, the State 
Board of Arbitration, appointed by Governor Robertson, attempted to solve the crisis 
between Southwestern Bell and striking operators.
80
 Their eventual report served as the 
major piece of evidence in debunking the sensationalist tales from the Tulsa World, and 
newspapers across the country. 
 95 
The State Board of Arbitration, appointed by Robertson, remained in Drumright 
to conduct an investigation of the differences between the company and employees, and 
on October 9, they issued a statement recommending the course of action for the 
opposing parties.
81
 A key demand of the State Board was that all employees of the 
telephone company be immediately reinstated without discrimination of membership in 
any organization which they may or may not belong.
82
 Such language targeted directly 
membership in the Socialist Party or other far leftist organizations, and showcased a 
remarkable sense of clarity in the hysteria laden time period. The Board also 
recommended the institution of an eight hour work day, attention given to sanitation and 
ventilation, and the appointment of a three-man group appointed by Southwestern Bell 
and the telephone operators to assist in reaching a satisfactory agreement.
83
 
The official report of the board sent to the governor's office concluded several key 
facts about the riot in Drumright. The document emphatically condemned the early 
reporting on the strike. "We believe that the spread of false and misleading statements 
concerning the early stage of the strike situation in Drumright was the cause of a lot of 
dissention in this community, and was put out by unknown, irresponsible parties."
84
 In 
one telling example of inaccuracies, the Board commented on reports of hundreds of 
shots fired by rioters, the claim that Mayor Nicodemus, Councilman Baxter, and the chief 
of police were jailed by the mob, and mob demands for resignation of the officials under 
threat of lynching. The report declared that "we have been unable to find any truth, 
whatever, in this report. Relative to the question of violence in Drumright, we will state 
that the State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation has been unable to find the slightest 




After the report came out, Ed Welch saw his day in court in Sapulpa, the county 
seat of Creek County. On November 3, Judge Lucien Wright presided over the case 
against the indicted agitator in the State vs. Ed Welch. County Attorney Earl Foster, 
assisted by R.B. Thompson engaged in prosecution, while John Hill of Drumright and 
Judge E.B. Hughes of Sapulpa acted as defense. The court proceedings occurred in an 
atmosphere rife with Red Scare paranoia, as just two days earlier, on November 1, the 
nationwide strike of coal miners occurred. This added further fuel to the fearful sentiment 
of the time, as many saw the walkout as a communist conspiracy aimed at destroying the 
US government. Governor Robertson refused to comply with demands of miners in the 
state, and Judge Wright commented on issue during the trial. He praised Robertson for 
his tough stance against labor during the crisis, and ended his letter by stating that "I am 
just beginning to realize the insidious spread of Bolshevikism. In my judgment it is 
imperative that those of us who believe in the perpetuation of the principles on which our 
government is based, stand shoulder to shoulder against radicalism in every form."
86
 The 
private opinions of the judge presiding over the case of an accused radical demonstrated 
how predisposed Wright was to suspect Welch.  
On November 6, the trial concluded, reaching a verdict of guilty of riot for the 
defendant, with the jury assessing his punishment as a misdemeanor. The court sentenced 
Welch to thirty days in jail and a fine of 500 dollars. The event showcased the true 
exaggeration of the Drumright riot, as the judge was hard-pressed to even convict a single 
individual for the disturbance. Originally, the first ballot on return to the jury room was 
six for conviction on a felony and six for acquittal. The jury took another ballot resulting 
in eight for conviction and four for acquittal. In a letter to Robertson betraying the 
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confidentiality of secret trial proceedings, Judge Wright slandered the four jurists voting 
for acquittal, calling them socialists. He later said that an individual advised him that one 
of the four saw jail time for obstructing the draft. This information came too late to effect 
the outcome of the trial, the judge lamented, and originally the four jurists intended to 
remain for acquittal, "but it having been intimated to them that court would remain in 
session for some days and that they would be kept together indefinitely, they finally 
announced that they would assent to a verdict of guilty if the punishment were assessed 
as a fine of 500 dollars and thirty days in jail."
87
 The eight who stood for conviction 
assented to the verdict, Wright said, to prevent a mistrial. The judge complained that 
while this was not the result the county attorney and others were looking for, it would 
have a constructive effect on individuals so inclined as the defendant was. He went on to 
say that County Attorney Foster "conducted one of the most vigorous prosecutions I have 
ever seen, confronted as he was with the difficulty of securing witnesses who were 
willing to testify to the truth and that four men in the jury box evidently opposed a 
conviction from the start."
88
 The governor responded to Wright's letter, stating that while 
he regretted the light penalty, he felt it a victory nonetheless.
89
 
Later in February 1920, an inquiry by the US Bureau of Investigation into the riot 
revealed conflicting information. The agent on-hand interviewed Mayor Nicodemus and 
Police Chief Jack Ary, who confusingly told that the riot occurred on September 21, 
rather than the 22 as papers at the time reported. They reiterated that the leaders of the 
riot were  Secretary of the International Oil Field Workers J.M. Fitzgerald, and Recording 
Secretary of the Labor and Trades Union Ed Welch. Members of the International Oil 
Field Workers Association remained under indictment for rioting, of which Ed Welch 
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was the primary suspect and the only one so far to receive a penalty. Nicodemus and Ary 
claimed that Welch, along with the other indicted men, were members of the IWW as 
they had been told from hearsay accounts that the group regularly attended Wobbly 
meetings. The police chief continued in the report, saying that all the other suspects were 
confirmed IWW members, who kept association with local radicals, including one 
"notorious IWW woman attorney of Drumright." The two local officials in question 
classified the incident as "serious rioting and disturbances," though with no deaths, no 
major acts of violence, and lasting only one night, one can call into question the 
definition of serious.
90
 The report remains part of a larger series of investigations done by 
the federal agency into Wobbly activity in Oklahoma. The testimony by Nicodemus and 
Ary does little to clarify the situation, and contradicts earlier information given by 
newspapers and townspeople. Despite this, it shows how concerned US officials were of 
radical activity in the state, and their willingness to investigate a headline grabbing 
incident that thrust Oklahoma into the heart of the First Red Scare. 
Order was restored in the town, though the rampant hysteria claimed another 
victim. Newspapers failed to help the matter, and acted only to make the situation worse. 
The town of Drumright served as a microcosm for the fear and paranoia that gripped the 
nation, as no town, no matter how small, was safe from the irrationality of the times. 
Strong blame lay directly with Governor Robertson, as the ordering in of the national 
guard into a situation that was, by all accounts, no where close to a riot, proved to be a 
gross overreaction. As a major test of leadership, he gave in to the prevailing attitudes 
and committed forces to what would have been, in any other time period, an insignificant 
event in the history of Oklahoma. The overall labor situation in the state appeared to 
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improve. A telephone strike in Shawnee as well as a street car strike in Chickasha ended 
without serious problems.
91
 Years later, important figures in the event would attempt to 
glorify their role in the Drumright affair. 
Adjutant-General and commander of national guard forces Charles F. Barrett 
demonstrated that he still succumbed to the hysteria when, writing in 1941, labeled the 
incident a Bolshevist and IWW riot. He argued the events in the town, though originally a 
simple telephone operators' strike, "were directly traceable to IWW influences and 
leadership."
92
 Contradicting the State Board of Arbitration, he repeated the alarmist and 
inaccurate storyline, saying the rioters "had gone so far as to disarm and assault the chief 
of police, drive the mayor out of the city, and to threaten to 'burn up the town.'"
93
 Barrett 
maintained the situation looked for a time like a second Omaha affair, where during race 
riots the local mayor was hanged by a mob. He told how the county judge of Creek 
County, along with the mayor of Drumright, requested military protection from the 
governor, and by the time of the national guard's arrival on September 23, they faced an 
armed group recruited by Wobblies from the surrounding oil fields that intended to make 
good on their threats to local officials.  
The sudden and unexpected appearance of the Guard in large numbers alarmed 
the mob, causing them to disperse, and allowing for the restoration of order.
94
 No Guard 
members fired any shots, according to Barrett, and "no person was hurt or injured from 
the time the Guard reached the scene of the disturbance, but the timely presence at 
Drumright of a formidable number of fully armed troops undoubtedly prevents wholesale 
destruction of property and the possible loss of lives."
95
 From his remembrance of the 
event, one can see the Red Scare mentality manifesting itself yet again. Barrett likely 
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would have scoffed at the idea of downplaying the event, as in his version of events, the 
National Guard achieved a heroic victory, standing as a bastion of order against a lawless 
chaos that threatened to engulf an entire town. According to the State Board of 
Arbitration, the truth of the matter was far simpler. For Barrett and his men however, 
much like the media and general public, deeds of daring and sensationalism far 
outweighed the necessity for truth. 
This attitude remained prevalent through the rest of the year and the remainder of 
the First Red Scare in 1920. Fears of labor discontent appeared on a constant basis and on 
September 30, Oklahoma City faced a strike by printers. Headlines raged across papers 
stating every printing office in the city was tied up, with demands made for $1.00 an hour 
and a 48 hour week by union printers.
96
 Every disturbance appeared through the lens of 
fear. With communist uprisings raging across the globe, each labor dispute or strike, and 
every protest against the government was viewed as somehow inspired by agitator 
elements with foreign influences. Within the confines of this viewpoint, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Sons of Veterans sent a letter to the governor, wherein he laid out his 
order’s goals in support of the government. He maintained that they “vigorously oppose 
all Bolshevik movements and tendencies, and all efforts that make for the destruction or 
impairment of our constitutional Union.”
97
 He went on to demand of “citizens one 
hundred percent Americanism. That we call upon congress to provide necessary laws for 
the deportation of all unregenerate aliens, and those who do not in good faith seek to 
become citizens.”
98
 The domestic environment continued to spiral out of control. Already, 
Robertson failed his first major test during the Red Scare in his willingness to succumb to 
the alarmist sentiments of the media. His overreaction proved that Oklahoma was willing 
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to commit military units to overblown reports that portrayed threats near the major 
resource centers of the state. Future strikes were seen through the lens of paranoia, and 
the governor performed his utmost in protecting the vital industries of the state, 
portraying Oklahoma as a stable and loyal state of the union. 
 Coinciding with the events in Drumright and strikes elsewhere, the state also 
shuttered with anticipation over an announced visit by President Woodrow Wilson, 
scheduled to take place on September 26th. He intended to tour Oklahoma, among other 
states across the country, and gather support for the United States to enter into the League 
of Nations treaty.
99
 Governor Robertson immediately began preparations to host the head 
of state, and created a committee to oversee the process. The governor, in an attempt to 
show support to the president, encouraged counties to draft resolutions of support to US 
entry into the League of Nations. To engage in this operation, he worked with local 
Democratic Party leaders, who in turn engaged their constituents and organized mass 
meetings to procure the vote. A letter from a community leader in Nowata stated that "we 
are complying with your request, and that the resolutions will be adopted and brought 
down to Oklahoma City to you."
100
 On September 26, as Wilson was en route from 
Kansas City, Missouri, his staff wired a telegram to the governor saying that the visit 
would be cancelled on account of poor health.
101
 Unofficially, the president had suffered 
a stroke and his staff hastily prepared for his return to Washington DC. 
 Eventually, the League of Nations would be defeated in the US legislature. So too 
would Robertson's attempts at portraying Oklahoma in a state of normalcy for the 
president. The strikes of Muskogee, Tulsa, and Drumright wreaked havoc on the state 
during the First Red Scare, plunging Oklahomans deeper into a sense of paranoia and fear. 
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They viewed communist conspiracies as everywhere, threatening the vital resources of 
the state. The disturbance in Drumright especially epitomized what the First Red Scare 
was all about. The town entered into the national spotlight, appearing as one of dozens of 
local events blown out of proportion by a news media swept up in hysteria. What began 
as a symbol of female activism quickly escalated, with the striking ladies taking a back 
seat to the dramatic pronouncements of doom from major newspapers. For the first time, 
the state was making national headline news, becoming a central story in the First Red 
Scare. Oklahoma would suffer yet another major panic before the paranoia concluded, 
only this time the event would become part of a nationwide strike that involved hundreds 
of thousands of miners. This walkout, spearheaded by the UMW, affected the mines 
around McAlester, caused the government to send in troops to protect its mineral interests, 
declare martial law, and drew the state further into the bowels of fear. It would be the last 
major event during the First Red Scare in Oklahoma, and along with Drumright, served 
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Chapter 5: The Coal Mining Strike of 1919 
The United Mine Workers of America initiated a strike on November 1, 1919 
against perceived unfair labor practices by mine operators. The walkout of hundreds of 
thousands of the nation's miners left the country paralyzed from lack of coal and fuel, and 
with the threat of a harsh winter looming, hurled the major mining states farther into the 
grips of Red Scare paranoia. Reactionaries incorrectly portrayed the miners as foreign 
Bolshevist radicals, intent on usurping power by holding hostage the resources of the 
country. Oklahoma, possessing valuable deposits of coal in the southeast, became a part 
of this national uproar, producing their second major Red Scare overreaction in 1919. By 
the end of the tumult, Governor Robertson had called out the national guard yet again, 
initiated martial law in several coal producing counties, and pandered to xenophobic 
tendencies of the people. A report later released by the state government revealed that 
foreign miners had few if any ties to communism, were not part of a Bolshevist plot, and 
threats to Oklahoma's supply of coal by radicalism were unfounded. The overreaction by 
Robertson remains a stark example of the paranoid fear of the time, and the miner's strike 
in the state stands alongside the Drumright affair as one of the two unfortunate yet main 
pillars of the First Red Scare in Oklahoma. 
The cause of the entire ordeal revolved around the precious resource of coal. 
Oklahoma contained an ample supply, with a mining area that included a string of towns 
next to McAlester, the county seat of  Pittsburg County, along with Coal County and 
Latimer County, within the Marginal Hills Belt, a prime area for the mining industry.
1
 
This important location drew migrant laborers from various European countries, thus 




Railways provided important links that carried supplies of coal to neighboring states and 
across the country. The Missouri, Kansas, and Texas railway, running 921 miles in 
Oklahoma, had major stops in McAlester, Coalgate, and other major mining towns, with 
transfers to other lines that went into Missouri and Colorado.
3
 McAlester showcased the 
dramatic effect of the abundant resources coupled with the rail system. Originally the site 
of a store operated by entrepreneur J.J. McAlester in 1869, by 1900, the population grew 
to over 3,000 and had had quadrupled to 12,000 by 1920.
4
 This dramatic increase in 
residents was replicated on a smaller scale all along the mining regions of Oklahoma, 
with influxes of workers streaming in from across the country and the world in search of 
work. These migrants would later draw suspicion from a population drummed up with 
war-hysteria, trained to fear foreign elements. In the meantime, they worked the land and 
attempted to make new lives for themselves in the relatively new state. 
The immigrant distribution in the region was highly diverse, with a record number 
of immigrants arriving yearly in towns such as McAlester as well as neighboring Krebs. 
Using McAlester as an example, its distribution of white population stood at 9,393, or 
over three-quarters of the total population. However, foreign-born whites and African-
Americans numbered 392 and 2,090 respectively.
5
 Italy held the record as the country 
with the most foreign nationals in Pittsburg County, with over 900 registered. The largest 
areas of occupations for Oklahoma remained in agriculture, though the coal industry 
boasted nearly 8,000.
6
 The various nationalities that helped make up the working classes 
drew much anger and criticism, bearing the brunt of assaults as reason gave way to 
paranoia during the First Red Scare. During 1919-1920, countless letters into the 
governor’s office warned against foreign nationals infiltrating the country and causing 
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great harm to the state.
7
  After the war, Oklahomans needed little encouragement in 
xenophobic tendencies. The influx of immigrants coupled with the history of the region 
caused many citizens and government officials to view the miners with distrust.  Pittsburg 
County reported some of the highest levels of socialist voting patterns in previous 
elections. During the 1914 election, for example, when Oklahoma voted for Socialist 
candidates in unprecedented numbers not seen before or since, Pittsburg County's vote 
for the Socialist candidate for president totaled 25-29 percent.
 8
 Historically, McAlester 
held a much higher proclivity for leftist candidates. In 1911 townspeople voted in two 
Socialist Party aldermen.
 9
 The influx of immigrants and the region's pro-socialist past all 
came to a head by 1919, as the forces of labor and business engaged in a volatile disputes 
centered on the state's mining industry. The disagreement culminated in the nationwide 
walkout of miners on November 1, creating a firestorm of fear and overreaction that few 
could have imagined. 
Having deferred demands for higher pay during the war, workers now wanted 
increased wages to offset the high cost of living. Originally in 1917, the government had 
signed a contract with mine workers fixing wages until World War I ended. At the 
conflict's bloody conclusion, the government refused to raise the workers' pay, citing 
economic difficulties. In October 1919, the justifiably agitated miners held a conference 
in Cleveland, Ohio, and presented mine operators with demands for better pay and fewer 
hours.
10
 The conference attendees included employers and employees of the Central 
Competitive Field (Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois) with no 
representation from western miners in states such as Colorado, New Mexico, and 
Oklahoma. However, in times past, decisions made by such conferences still affected 
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mining districts outside the Central Competitive Field.  The demands included an 
increase of sixty percent of current wages paid for day labor, a reduction to six hours of 
work per day, five days a week with exceptions made during emergencies, and during 
such instances time and a half for overtime be granted along with double wages for work 
done on holidays, with Saturday and Sunday regarded as such. Also, workers would only 
work double shifts during emergencies, miners violating their contract would not be 
required to pay any penalty as was then the case, and that in event coal operators did not 
accept all demands made by the union, a strike would be called on November 1.
11
 The 
demands laid out at the Cleveland convention became the basis for all contracts under 
negotiation in the United States.
12
 With the two sides unable to reach an agreement, the 
threatened strike appeared ever more likely.  
As the walkout of workers loomed across the nation, mine operators struck the 
first blow in a bid for public support. On October 20, the Colorado and New Mexico Coal 
Operators' Association sent a letter to dealers and consumers of coal playing up the 
danger of the situation. They quoted John Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers 
of America, who said that "the government cannot stop the threatened strike of coal 
miners," and that unless coal operators accept their demands, they would shut down every 
coal mine in the country without question or modification.
13
 The letter further claimed the 
strike maliciously punished coal consumers of the entire nation as well as operators. It 
concluded that the limited number of operators in the eastern and middle states were not 
able to grant the workers' demands, labeling them "oppressive, despotic and tyrannical." 
Furthermore, the wages paid remained sufficient, and there was no logic in the request for 
a decrease of work hours. They compared the earnings of mine workers to other 
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professions, saying that their $250 a month exceeded even that of doctors, lawyers, and 
merchants.
14
 The mine operators argued that the decrease in hours would reduce the 
output of the mines to an alarming rate. They produced mathematical calculations 
showing that a mine producing 50,000 tons per month would not even be able to produce 
over 30,000 tons under the UMW demands, and the production capabilities during the 
critical winter season would not exceed sixty percent of its former output. The letter 
concluded that citizens needed to express their opinions to governmental leaders, and that 
if the public refused to support mine operators, they would be forced to accede to the 
demands because the populace could not survive without coal. This in actuality bolstered 
morale for UMW members, who saw that if they successfully held out long enough they 
would force mine owners to capitulate to their demands. The document ended in 
threatening tones, stating that "the high cost of living can only be remedied by increasing 
production. It cannot be remedied by decreasing output. If the union succeeds in the 
demands, the increase in cost and price of coal to you will be for all time and not a 
temporary matter."
15
 Further letters attempted to demonize the miners, calling their 
demands unreasonable and their methods akin to radicalism.  
On October 24, the Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators' Association sent a 
letter to Governor Robertson detailing their conversations with Governor Henry Allen of 
Kansas, and how they planned on solving the situation. The association had told Allen 
that unless the government took serious measures, the strike would cause "untold 
suffering and misery." The letter explained that the wage increase was unjustified by the 
present cost of living, and if the government granted it or any other increase above 
present rates, it would be an outrage to Americans everywhere. The coal operators 
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predicted that the strike would create a crisis unparalleled in the history of American 
industry, and called for "the most drastic and vigorous governmental action in dealing 
with the Bolshevic[sic] spirit shown in these demands."
16
 They further urged state 
representatives to enact legislation to hold labor legally responsible for their acts and to 
enforce existing anti-trust laws against them, thus protecting the welfare of citizens 
against such "autocratic acts of radicals in union labor ranks."
17
  
As mine operators demonized their opponents and labeled them incorrectly as 
radicals in the lead-up to the strike, Governor Robertson attempted to prevent a strike in 
his own state. To that end, he called a conference in McAlester, inviting both sides of the 
dispute to participate.
18
 He wished for miners to stay on the job regardless of the national 
strike, while those workers desired to follow the directives of the United Mine Workers 
of America.
19
 Negotiations collapsed, and all evidence pointed to the walkout going on as 
planned on November 1.
20
 Revealing his biases and anti-miner sentiment, Robertson 
responded to the workers with indignation at their threat to cut off coal supply to the 
nation, stating “we’ll see who’s running this old USA,” and that the strike was “nothing 
short of a lawless conspiracy.”
 21
 After adjourning the conference, the governor bluntly 
stated that the coal mines of Oklahoma would remain in operation. "I made that statement 
this morning and I meant it," he explained. Robertson saw little use in prolonging the 
summit and instead chose to convert it into a meeting of patriotic American citizens. He 
proclaimed that all who cared to stay for that kind of meeting were welcome. No one left 
the room, and the governor began the task of ensuring that the fierce bite of winter would 
not affect his constituents. To heat Oklahoma homes, he proposed the importation of coal 
from New Mexico and Colorado mines, worked by non-union laborers. He had originally 
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opposed such a move as it would have harmed Oklahoma union miners, but now that they 
were on strike, he felt no compulsion to assist them.
22
  Hearkening to the fears of 
immigrant labor and their supposed ties to radicalism, the governor sent a telegram to US 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, claiming “About 30 or 40 percent of the miners in 
this state are alien non-citizens. Their refusal to work is due largely to failure to 
appreciate our government and renders them and their presence undesirable in every 
way.”
23
 This unsympathetic language demonstrated Robertson’s harsh stance and his 
unwillingness to compromise with the so-called enemies of America, a common attitude 
he held throughout the crisis, and a holdover from the paranoid World War I era. 
Countless groups and individuals supported the governor’s overly harsh rhetoric 
against the mine workers, with reams of letters flowing in to his office. One 
correspondence framed the conflict in patriotic terms, stating that “We desire to 
congratulate you on your stand for Americanism, and heartily endorse your attitude in 
requesting the deportation of all aliens. If we only had more public officials who would 
champion the cause of the general public, the Anarchists, Socialists, IWW and other 
tendencies towards destroying our American institutions would soon be a thing of the 
past.”
24
 One unique form of support came from G.J. Rousseau, a minister at First Baptist 
Church in Norman. He sent a letter to the governor expressing his admiration and support 
for the harsh stand taken against the miners, and also enclosed a copy of a sermon he 
planned on delivering the following Sunday. This lengthy oration served as an 
enlightening look into the popular notions of average Oklahomans, and the level of 
politics mixed with preaching that pervaded the chaotic period after World War I. In his 
address, the pastor opined on the strike: "is it to remedy oppressive conditions of labor 
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that the coal miners are striking and tying up the commerce of the country and subjecting 
110 million of people to misery, sickness, and semi-starvation with a bitter winter setting 
in?"   
Rousseau, displaying in full force his tendency to believe the alarmist calls of the 
day, introduced a comment from the New York World, which claimed that nine tenths of 
present strikes occurred not from honest desires to improve conditions but from a skillful 
body of revolutionary leaders whose sole object was the disruption of the present social 
system.
25
 Using newspapers to further the red hysteria, the sermon reprinted quotes from 
the New York Evening World, which stated that there existed revolutionary bodies, such 
as the IWW, which aimed at overthrowing the institutions of government and currently 
controlled over 30 percent of all organized labor. Endorsing the current labor-capital 
relationship, he went on to conclude that the situation demanded "square-jawed 
Americanism," and that it was time to "skim the scum from the melting pot" and deport 
the foreign reactions who had abused American hospitality.
26
 Bringing in the legacy of 
war paranoia, the pastor proclaimed that citizens should show the government the same 
solidarity and singleness of purpose that they used to defeat the "Hun," and that "we 
should break the back and crush the head of that rattle snake of radicalism within the 
labor unions."
27
 The pastor concluded that if the teachings of Jesus were applied, the 
Bolshevik would "shave his whiskers, take a bath and go to work; applied to predatory 
labor unions it will cause them through their constituencies to give fair value to fair value 
received."
28
   
This sermon fully laid bare the reactionism that a pervaded all levels of society. 
Not only from the media and government was paranoia preached, but also from the pulpit 
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as well, creating a virulent strain of suspicion that enabled the public to believe in even 
the wildest notions of communist infiltration, and support any action to dislodge this 
menace. This held profound ramifications for deeply religious Oklahoma, as the faithful 
received weekly doses of indoctrination in fear from many of their trusted religious 
leaders. One by one, the major institutions and centers of influence fell to the Red Scare 
hysteria. It was not long before these sentiments impacted schooling, as the media 
drummed up fears that education would succumb to communist infiltration. 
The same day the nationwide coal strike began, the Daily Oklahoman reported on 
a group of high school students that threatened a strike of their own. Twelve boys and 
girls asked for shorter hours, among other concessions, and held gatherings to convince 
school authorities to accede to their demands. The newspaper portrayed the event in 
dramatic undertones, saying that “For two days the trouble had been brewing… During 
the ‘fifth period’ yesterday, about 200 determined pupils gathered in the front corridor. 
Bloodshed was averted when the class bells rang for the next period."
29
 The Oklahoman 
went on to say the remainder of the “angry throng” scattered for class rooms, and 
possibly planned a future strike.
30
  Those who were caught in the act were detained for an 
extra hour after school, and, according to school officials, the only display of violence 
during the disturbance occurred when one of the so called rioters, “in the heat of passion 
forgot herself and, in the hearing of several bystanders, exclaimed 'Oh, fudge!'”
31
 An 
editorial in the newspaper dramatically exaggerated the event, calling the students a 
juvenile soviet whose actions were "extremely deplorable." It complained that the 
determined stand taken by the would-be strikers displayed a well-defined spirit of 
bolshevism among students, who sought to emulate radical adults. The newspaper 
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concluded that the cure for these young communists was a good spanking.
32
 The dramatic 
tendencies of state papers to exaggerate events to revolutionary proportions were truly a 
skill greatly utilized by the media during the first Red Scare. With threats of radical 
activity coming from newspapers, the government, schools, and the pulpit, no realm of 
society was safe from harmful paranoia. This attitude dramatically effected the coal 
mining strike, and influenced the governor's actions in dealing with the supposedly 
Bolshevist inspired UMW. 
With the public receiving paranoid indoctrination across all levels of society, the 
coal mining situation continued to deteriorate as supplies threatened to diminish. 
Desperate pleas soon rolled in to Robertson's office regarding the lack of fuel. One 
telegram told how the town of Brinkman remained out of coal for two weeks and that the 
people there “are badly in need.”
33
 Another from Chickasha ruefully explained that the 
city was out of coal and that if the mines shut down suffering would result.
34
 Despite the 
appeal of citizens, Robertson still rebuffed the idea of concessions for the workers. On 
November 1, 1919, the strike became reality as 8,000 miners in the state and 400,000 
nationwide refused to work in protest of better wages and conditions. The ensuing 
debacle lasted for thirty-seven days and cost Oklahoma $10,000,000.
35
 By November 3, 
Chief Mine Inspector Ed Boyle sent out a letter to all assistant mine inspectors regarding 
the attitudes that the government office needed to take to diffuse the situation. He clearly 
endorsed a non-confrontational posture, instructing his staff not to take sides in the 
dispute or use the power of the office to aid one over another. He next took a jab at 
Robertson, whose famous escapade during the Drumright ordeal remained fresh in the 
minds of Oklahomans. Boyle explained that, while officials had a right to personal 
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opinions in any controversy that arise, they had no right to inject their opinion in official 
acts and that one needed to stand openly for law and order. Any group, miners or 
operators, deserved the same if they violated laws and civil authority.
 36
 Perhaps 
predicting Robertson's eventual overreaction, the chief mine inspector said that if the 
governor decided to suspend civil authority and establish martial law, the duties of the 
mine inspectors in enforcing mining laws would cease until civil rule was restored. Until 
then, all inspectors should carry out their duty, he wrote.
 37
 While Boyle acted rationally 
throughout the event, Robertson believed that a vast Bolshevist conspiracy lay behind the 
miner's actions.  
In preparation for the walkout, the governor once again called out the national 
guard under the command of Adjutant General Barrett. The general's men numbered over 
2,000, and occupied positions in effected areas, including McAlester, Henryetta and 
Coalgate.
38
 Countless citizens offered their praise to the governor for his action. Soon 
after, Robertson sent a call out for volunteer miners to provide coal for the people of 
Oklahoma.
39
 The American Legion sent a letter to Robertson pledging their support in 
“upholding Law and Order in Oklahoma”
40
 and offered to dig coal, do police duty, or any 
other wish the state desired. The governor responded, thanking the Legion for their 
“patriotic” offer.
41
 Countless citizens viewed the summoning of the Guard as a positive 
development.  Over twenty years after the event, General Barrett looked with pride on 
the work of the National Guard in what he saw as the state's "first supreme test." He 
framed the situation as a foreign threat, stating that a large percent of the miners came 
from other countries and recognized only the orders of mine officials as supreme law.
42
 
He lauded the governor for his actions, saying that Robertson had tried by intercession 
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with mine leaders to avoid the distresses of the strike, but his pleas had little effect. 
Barrett maintained that while historical troubles plagued the Ohio and Pennsylvania 
mining communities, Oklahoma and Arkansas miners had "no particular grievance," and 
only struck out of sympathy to show solidarity for their brothers in other states.
 
The 
general claimed that the prompt calling out of the guard and its efficient service in 
protecting lives and property, as well as the supplying of coal, was welcomed as a great 
and necessary public service.
43
  
Small-scale disturbances occurred throughout the mining community during the 
guard's deployment. One operator told of a striker who chased two mine company 
officers away. The miner late threatened the operator's home. General Barrett quickly 
issued a threat to mine workers stating that if any further disturbances occurred, he would 
exert military control over the entire mining district.
44
 As the general later recounted, 
however, some troops encountered favorable conditions among the miners, who 
welcomed them and expected to get along well with them.
45
 He explained the miners 
themselves thanked the guard for the fair and considerate treatment they had exhibited 
toward them.
46
 Overall the general claimed a great victory for the guard, and held 
steadfast in his belief  that the governor's actions combated the foreign menace of the 
union workers. Robertson continued to act upon his xenophobic tendencies, and 
attempted to curtail alien influence in the state. 
In statements made during the crisis, Robertson explained his desire to rid 
Oklahoma of foreign radicals. The population met these statements with overwhelming 
support. One citizen from Ardmore declared of Robertson that “You hit the bullseye 
when you said let us deport these aliens.”
47
 Another individual wrote in an 
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uncompromising letter that “I trust you will insist upon the President causing all foreign 
miners, who refused to work, after Nov. 1, be deported. If they don’t like our ‘Uncle 
Sam’ let them go back to their own beloved country.”
48
 The actions of the governor 
continued to influence the populace, as citizens appeared on the lookout for suspected 
Communist activity. One letter from an individual in Oklahoma City maintained “As a 
patriotic citizen I congratulate you on good stand regarding the mining strike. Will you 
kindly inform me to whom one should report a man for Bolshevistic talk?”
49
 These 
sentiments hardly appear surprising. The near complete inundation of fear spurred by the 
government, media, pulpit, and schools helped promote such ideals, with each group 
influencing and feeding off each other at the expense of common sense. 
Showcasing his similar lack of rationality and unwillingness to compromise, 
Governor Robertson called the strike an insurrection leading to anarchy, and an act of 
disloyalty to the government. He condemned the laborers, and said “The state of 
Oklahoma cannot abdicate its sovereign rights at the dictates of any foreign controlled 
labor oligarchy and it will not surrender while I am Governor to a conspiracy among 
labor leaders that measures the supremacy of our laws, the orderly progress of civil 
government and the very lives and physical welfare of our people.”
50
 In an open letter 
printed during the time, one citizen encouraged harsher laws to protect against agitating 
workers. “Congress should immediately propose and pass laws to confine the labor 
unions to their original beneficent purpose, and to control the criminal conspiracy 
commonly called ‘strike.’”
51
 The individual called for the execution of union leaders to 
protect unions from future invasions of anarchists.
52
 Shortly after the UMW walkout on 
November 1, Governor Robertson contacted Attorney General Palmer and told of the dire 
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situation in the state. He mentioned that the coal strike was 100 percent effective, and that 
he still believed the deportation of aliens was advisable. He concluded by offering his 
further services to Palmer, stating that he desired to cooperate with him “in every way in 
the entire matter.”
53
 While threatening removal of foreigners from the mines, Robertson 
faced the difficult task of filling gaps left by the striking workers. 
Robertson fully intended to use volunteer as well as convict labor to work the 
mines and on November 2, he released a statement justifying his decision to call out the 
guard. He explained that its purpose was to give every man who wished to work in the 
mines the opportunity of doing so without interference from the strikers. The governor 
maintained he would operate every mine in the state where he could receive sufficient 
help, and admitted to using criminals from the prison farm at McAlester to act as convict 
labor.
54
 Robertson faced a challenge, however, as some states including Illinois and 
Oklahoma had laws requiring examination of miners before allowing them to work. Chief 
Mine Inspector Boyle also disagreed with the governor, fearing the influx of 
inexperienced miners. He stated that he would forbid any operations with "green men," 
including soldiers.
55
 General Barrett later referred to Boyle as a "mild degree of 
anarchist," and reportedly called him and his deputies lunatics.
56
 
Boyle attempted to stymie the governor's plans and on November 10, one of his 
deputy state mine inspectors unsuccessfully tried to prevent convict laborers from 
working the mines. Under orders from the chief mine inspector, the deputy inspector 
went to the McAlester penitentiary to stop operations at the Hiawatha mine. General 
Barrett took the man into custody, releasing him two hours later. Barrett later issued 
orders stating that any person who attempted to go through the guard lines to prevent 
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further mine work was to be held by troops. He stated that "wherever our lines are 
established, martial law is established. Martial law puts out of operation the civil law 
under which Boyle claims the authority to prevent the working of the mines by convicts." 
He went on to say that any further attempts to prevent the digging of coal would only 
lead to more arrests, and he would hold the prisoners until convinced they would not try 
to make any more trouble.
57
  
While the national guard oversaw the mining camps, an undercover special agent, 
former Deputy US Marshal Chris Madsen was sent in to examine conditions. The sending 
of undercover agents to assess the situation was not new during the strike. Earlier, the US 
government employed several investigators to infiltrate and damage the reputation of the 
United Mine Workers and its president, John Lewis.
58
 An injunction handed down by the 
government in October forbidding the UMW to take part in the proposed strike helped set 
up a legal precedent for federal investigation once the violation occurred.
59
 Afterwards, 
Attorney General Palmer sent out word advising US attorneys to cooperate with US 
Marshals and Bureau of Investigation agents to search out violators of the injunction.
60
  
Madsen figured prominently into the aforementioned plan and was dispatched to the coal 
mines to uncover the supposed intentions of the strikers. He interviewed the 
superintendent of the mines, and attempted to discover the state of the situation. Madsen 
reported that the surface mines “can be worked at any time with unskilled labor.”
61
 He 
commented on the status of explosives at the mines, and the lack of sufficient guards to 
protect the stores from being raided by striking miners. Madsen explained that the 
superintendent consented to put more men to watch the magazines and to confer with the 
military officers and abide by their decision to employ more guards. He went on to tell 
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how he secretly interviewed miners and strong union members, and how some of the men 
sought work on other places such as the lead fields.
62
 Reiterating the non-revolutionary 
aims of the workmen, Madsen reported that that they did not want the public to suffer, 
and would make no objections to anyone working in the mines. The special agent also 
told of the poor working conditions miners had to endure, and how both they and mine 
operators suffered from it. “The miners in this district are practically broke… not 
withstanding the bold face they have shown they will be compelled to work or stave in a 
very short time or else go to work at other occupations.”
63
 Madsen's report presented a 
clear rebuttal to the fear-mongering sentiments of the government, media, and public. His 
conclusions revealed that the union miners were not influenced by radical, communist 
ideology, nor were they opposed to non-union laborers working to provide coal for the 
state. They merely wished for operators to improve their conditions and would not 
violently stand in the way of the government.  
Robertson ignored Madsen's report, and continually sent other operatives 
undercover as intelligence agents, including national guard personnel. A report issued by 
the national guard in the McAlester coal mines provided information about the suspected 
cases of radicalism among the workers. The document revealed that IWW leaders started 
courting UMW laborers that they thought could be useful to their cause. “He is then 
asked quietly to join. In the event of refusal, he is asked two more times; if he refuses the 
third time, he is shot from ambush. One instance of this kind happened near 
Hartshorne.”
64
 The report went on to dispel rumors of radical support, maintaining that 
the strikers as a body did not endorse the IWW, and in fact, seemed very much afraid of 
them.
65
 In another report from the 2nd Infantry, an undercover officer reported that few 
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strikers expressed a willingness to go back to work except under a written order from 
their UMW superiors. The mood of the strikers appeared extremely sullen, with some 
reports of resentment towards the national guard. One example told of a certain doctor in 
McCurtain who pretended to be a friend of the guard and offering his medical services. 
After treating an injured hand of one of the men, the doctor later went away and stated 
that he wished it had been the guardsmen's neck instead of his hand that was injured.
66
 As 
witnessed, not everyone remained pleased with the calling out of the national guard. One 
telegram from the Oklahoma School of Mines requested the governor to remove all 
troops from the buildings and campus. They complained that school was impossible and 
that if not removed at once, students “will quit.”
67
  
Despite minor setbacks, the guard continued in its duty to protect the mines, as 
national representatives of both sides sought an end to the conflict. To that end, a federal 
judge issued an injunction against the UMW's leaders, with the union filing a countersuit 
demanding the order be lifted. After threats and legal wrangling, the union agreed to an 
order issued by Judge A.B. Anderson to withdraw the strike order. After a lengthy debate 
between the two parties, at around 4:10 in the morning John Lewis voiced his compliance 
with the court, stating that "we do it under protest. We are Americans. We cannot fight 
our government. That is all."
68
 The union later issued a statement to all its workers: 
In obedience to the mandate issued on November 8 by the United States 
court district of Indiana, Judge A.B. Anderson presiding, the undersigned 
hereby advises you that the order of October 15 directing a cessation of 





By November 13, coal miners and operators once again convened at the meeting table to 
negotiate a new wage scale. Over 200 operators and 100 representatives from miners 
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attended the conference. Spirits remained high as miners expected to receive improved 
wages while the government and public at large expected them to resume work in the 
mines. While the strike recall order had been received, Illinois district President Frank 
Farring stated that he did not believe the men would return to work. Alexander Howat, 
President of the Kansas miners, numbering around 10,000, was quoted as saying he 
looked for no general resumption of production. The McAlester News-Capital reported in 
hopeful tones however, stating that "from West Virginia, Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah came optimistic reports. In the majority of mines in 
those states it was believed normal production would be reached by Monday."
70
 On 
November 18, the News-Capital reported that national guardsmen intended to leave per 
orders from General Barrett. He informed Robertson that, in light of the successes in 
negotiation, continued presence of the guard was useless. The guard had arrived on 
November 1, the day the strike began, and as the local McAlester paper stated, had little 
to do during the crisis. "Sent purely as a precautionary measure, there has been no hint of 
trouble which would occasion their use."
71
  
 The conference between mine operators and labor stalled, as both sides argued 
over proposed wages. By late November, the talks collapsed. Frustrated with the lack of 
progress, the US government threatened to take over all idle coal mines if owners failed 
to increase production.
72
 On November 29, mine owners offered to open up the work 
sites to non-union men.
73
 Robertson selected President of the State Board of Agriculture 
and Chairman of the State Council of Defense J.A. Whitehurst to oversee the use of 
volunteer labor in the state. Whitehurst proposed that rations of coal be based on number 
of volunteers each county supplied to work in the mines and fixed wages based on the 
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last government offer at the conference with the UMW, which was a 14 percent increase 
from current wages.
74
 Robertson appealed for federal troops to protect the volunteer force, 
and again called out the National Guard. One member of the State Council of Defense 
declared that "volunteers by the hundreds from all sections have offered their services in 
manning the coal mines of the state." He told of scores of offers and telegrams pouring 
into his office, and all throughout the state citizens volunteered to work in the mines. 
These efforts eventually produced 3,000 tons of coal, but provided less than one-half of 
the state's daily demand, estimated at 7,000 tons.
75
  
 Unfortunately for Robertson, comments he made early in the crisis came back to 
haunt him. As the strike began, the governor had encouraged citizens to practice self-
preservation and seize any coal supply they could possibly lay their hands upon. This 
caused some individuals in western Oklahoma to steal coal from freight trains passing 
through the state. In one instance, an engineer reported that a mob confiscated his 
shipment of coal after they were informed his train carried an entire car of the precious 
resource. The locomotive originally intended to carry the coal to Tipton to supply the 
town. The train engineer recommended that distribution of coal be stopped altogether 
unless they had public support.
76
 On December 2, 1919 these actions forced Robertson to 
backtrack from his earlier statements, as the federal regional director of railroads 
instructed the governor to cancel his call for self-preservation or else he would halt all 
trains operating in Oklahoma. Robertson was attending a coal conference in Chicago at 
that time and hurriedly rushed back to the state to rescind his previous call to action.
77
 
The governor's irresponsible handling of the strike compounded the already difficult 
situation, and demonstrated his aversion to reason during the panic-induced event. 
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 By the time Robertson returned to Oklahoma, an increasing number of volunteers 
had arrived to work in the mines. To protect the workers from the supposedly violent 
conditions, Robertson declared martial law on December 4, 1919 in Pittsburg, Latimer, 
Leflore, Haskell, Coal, and Okmulgee counties.
78
 Officially, Robertson declared that he 
sought to protect the lives of citizens, uproot sedition, prevent sabotage and criminal 
syndicalism, and secure coal for fuel purposes whereby the lives and health of the people 
may be properly protected.
79
 The governor then requested 1,000 federal troops to assist. 
A controversy arose when the commander at Fort Sam Houston offered to include two 
black infantry companies. Robertson protested fiercely and prevented them from being 
called out. The governor later wrote that owing to his protest, the government would call 
for white troops only.
80
  
 With the freedom allowed the government during martial law, breaks in union 
solidarity slowly appeared as Robertson took harsher actions. The governor ordered all 
strikers and their families evicted from company houses at the Dawley mines southeast of 
McAlester. After negotiation, the miners agreed to go back to work as volunteers if 
troops would protect them. General Barrett surmised that only half would return to work. 
The News-Capital assessed that an ultimatum had forced the miners back to work 
recommended such actions as the only path to future success.
81
  
 By December 9, both parties agreed to a conference in Indianapolis to solve the 
issues. Attorney General Palmer remained confident that workers would accept the new 
government proposal, which included a 14 percent wage increase and a guarantee from 
President Wilson to create an investigative committee for the purposes of wage 
readjustment given the increased cost of living. The two sides reached a compromise, 
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leaving Robertson severely unhappy.
82
 The governor dramatically opposed the 
compromise in Indianapolis. In a letter to an acquaintance, he wrote “You must not forget 
that this coal strike was settled against my wishes. I have at all times opposed any 
compromise. I was very much opposed to the compromise effected at Indianapolis.”
83
 He 
also said “If I had been consulted in regard to the matter at all, there would have been no 
compromise at all. As it was, however, I was compelled to withdraw the volunteers and 
troops after the order had been issued from Washington.”
84
 Robertson concluded his 
letter by mentioning the effect of the volunteers and cited their intelligence and patriotism 
as the key weapon that helped stem the tide of the strikers.
85
 By December 11, the News-
Capital reported in bold headlines that over four thousand union miners would return to 
the McAlester mines for the first time since November 1, with others heading back to 
work nationwide. After the settlement, the paper portrayed the miners in a understanding 
tone, saying that "their strike was a sympathetic one. While they demanded an increase in 
wages and while they will profit by the 14 percent increase... they had no personal quarrel 
with any of the operators of Oklahoma. They stopped work when miners and operators of 
the central competitors did."
86
 
Despite this sympathy for the miners, numerous citizens lavished praise upon 
Robertson for his heavy-handed actions during the strike. Contemporaries saw his 
policies as a reinforcement of the paranoid hysterical attitude that prevailed during the 
time period. Robertson expressed no regrets. Pioneer Cotton Mills stated that the stand 
Robertson took against the miner’s strike was commendable, writing “Every good citizen 
of Oklahoma will be willing to back you up in whatever step it might take to see that your 
orders are obeyed.” Another congratulatory letter from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of 
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Oklahoma explained “As far as I have been able to ascertain, all the anarchists, socialists, 
and criminals at large are bitterly opposed to your recent conduct toward the miners’ 
strike.”
87
 President of Central State Normal School John G. Mitchell wrote to the 
governor making note of a criticism by a member of the United Mine Workers, and 
explained that such a harsh denunciation was a distinct honor. “I take this opportunity of 
saying to you that your action in this crisis should meet, and in my judgment will meet, 
the hearty endorsement of a grateful public," he argued. "If there is anything that Central 
State Normal can do further to assist you please command me.”
88
 
 After union workers returned to the mines, a commission appointed by Robertson 
released a report in January 1920, attempting to solve questions over the causes of the 
strike. The information was collecting through hearings conducted in November and 
December of 1919, with the final report reaching the governor's desk at the dawn of the 
new year. Particular credence in the report was given to the ethnic and international 
make-up of the miners, and whether they adhered to any socialist tendencies. No 
evidence of such was found.
89
 Taking place in McAlester, committee members 
interviewed key individuals involved in the strikes, from General Barrett, to local mine 
operators, and even workers. This report provided a scathing indictment of the Red Scare 
hysteria, proving that much of the claims of IWW links and foreign-born agitators 
seemed fraudulent. One of the first questions asked to the adjutant general involved the 
number of foreigners present in the mines. Barrett replied that 55-60 percent of the 
workers were American citizens. The committee then asked if foreigners were the most 
dangerous, to which the general said that the worst element in the mines were the 
 132 




 This notion at first seemed unbelievable to the committee members, but as the 
hearing wore on, the supposed communist and foreign element of the coal strike 
seemingly evaporated. The general also revealed that the majority of people in the 
affected coal counties, those closest to the action, held great support for the striking 
miners. This stood in stark contrast to places where anti-miner and Red Scare sentiment 
abounded, areas farther away from the actual event.
91
 In questioning Major Johnson, a 
member of the national guard at McAlester, the committee again inquired whether 
foreigners influenced the position of American miners. He replied emphatically that such 
was not the case, and reiterated Barrett's earlier statement that foreign miners were the 
best behaved, and were humble, meek, and fearful of trouble.
92
 After the report came out, 
no connection with Bolshevist activity was seen in the miner’s demands and the foreign 
threat appeared made-up.  
 The event turned into yet another spectacle of the Red Scare that showcased the 
irrational fear of the people and government. The key argument in favor of calling out the 
national guard and taking strong action against the miners involved workers' links to 
communism, foreign influence, and threats to the security of the nation and the state's 
resources. As soon as the strike occurred on November 1, the people in Oklahoma and 
across the country called for strong action from the government, demanding the 
deportation of foreigners, suspected radicals, and any other supposed menace that 
threatened the security of the state. All sectors of society in Oklahoma, including the 
government, media, religion, education, and the civilian population succumbed to the 
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hysteria and overreacted to what in any other year would have been a simple labor 
dispute. The report issued by the government, similar to the Drumright report, proved 
conclusively that rumors of radicalism were overblown. The foreign miners were actually 
the best behaved of the group, with the greater threat coming from Americans. The 
miner's strike along with the Drumright affair stand as the two major pillars of the First 
Red Scare in Oklahoma. They illustrate the willingness of a population to forgo reason in 
favor of reactionism and fear, and as the report by the government revealed, the greatest 
threat came not from the foreign element, but from Americans themselves. The paranoia 
endemic to the Scare soon expanded on the national level, and after the end to the coal 
mining strike, calls against radicalism reached their peak. As 1919 came to a close and 
the US fearfully entered 1920, a new wave of arrests, deportations, and hysteria would 
rock the nation, after which Oklahoma and the rest of the country would finally recover 
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Chapter 6: The End of the First Red Scare, 1920 
 By 1920, major disputes over labor, resources, and radicals associated with the 
First Red Scare had ended. After confronting the IWW in the east, and the overblown 
handling of the Drumright and McAlester strikes, the domestic scene in the state entered 
a period of relative calm. Minor strikes still occurred, and the state still gave in to the 
paranoia exhibited on the national scene. However, no major disturbances or radical 
activities occurred on the level of those in the previous year. This resulted from the 
security of the state's resources. The government and populace had successfully crushed 
the IWW in the oil fields and the presence of the national guard in Drumright served as a 
warning to any other imagined Bolshevist that threatened the region. The miners in the 
coal fields agreed to go back to work, and for now the state's mineral resources appeared 
safe. While across the nation the First Red Scare would reach its zenith in the beginning 
of 1920, Oklahoma appeared on the sidelines only. The state still gave in to the hype and 
paranoia, though since its resources remained secure, no instances on the level of the 
events of 1919 occurred. By the summer of 1920, the ludicrous spectacle would burn 
itself out, leaving behind a startling legacy of post-war fears and insecurities, stemming 
from the volatile relationship between resources, radicals, and reactionaries.  
 On the national scene, Attorney General Palmer continued in his drive against 
radicals and initiating the Palmer Raids in December of 1919. By January he, assisted by 
J. Edgar Hoover and the Department of Justice, rounded up thousands for deportation  
to the Soviet Union.
1
 Abuses of detainees appeared evident from the start, though few 
spoke out about it. Acting Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post, a staunch believer in due 
process, cancelled the warrants of over 2000 suspects, and stated that party membership 
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did not violate the Sedition Act of 1918.
2
 By April 1920, Kansas Representative Homer 
Hoch introduced a resolution to impeach the secretary of labor for his unpatriotic 
actions.
3
 Despite the groundswell of animosity towards the acting secretary, the 
government cleared him of all charges and stated that he acted accordingly within the 
law.
4
   
 Governor Robertson continued in his steadfast belief of the dangers of radicals, 
and plainly said as much during a special session of the legislature convened in the off-
year of 1920. In his opening address, the governor told how “no wise man can shut his 
eyes to the dangers which face us and which, at times, to my mind, threaten to engulf 
us.”
5
 He went on to say that “The public mind, in these days, is anything but stable; the 
fact that some people, ordinarily very reasonable and responsible, cannot see and 
properly appraise the dangers of the situation is the best evidence of the need of 
conservatism in every line of human activity.”
6
 Robertson again defended himself before 
possible critics, recalling how the coal strike necessitated only the most prompt and 
vigorous action on his part. “The situation was such that nothing but immediate and 
energetic action would answer and, whether or not the conduct of this affair could have 
been improved, the fact remains that the state did the very best it could under the 
circumstances, and I am free to suggest, judging from the newspaper reports, resolutions 
of civic bodies, letters and other means of communication, that the action of the state… 
was endorsed by ninety-five percent of the people.”
7
 
Going against the prevailing tide, and possibly sensing the end was near for Red 
Scare hysteria, Oklahoma Senator Robert L. Owen spoke of on the issue of restrictive 
legislation in January 1920. He proclaimed that that such measures 
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can become and will become dangerous in the highest degree to the 
liberties of the people of this country, so that there would be hanging over 
the head of every man who desires free speech or freedom of the press the 
menace of some bureaucrat who could suddenly arrest, interfere with, and 
treat him as a criminal with all the powers of this gigantic Government 
brought down upon the head of the little citizen, who would find it 




He also commented on the irrational fear that pervaded the environment: “We 
passed laws, under the excitement and hysteria of war, with a view to punishing the so-
called Bolsheviks in this country; and I pause to say that in my judgment there are very 
few Bolsheviks in the United States. The atmosphere of the United States is not such as 
to encourage bolshevism.”
9
 The tide began to turn against reactionaries, with more 
politicians, officials, and members of the public speaking out. 
 One of the major turning points of the First Red Scare nationally occurred in May 
of 1920. Earlier that April, Palmer predicted a massive anarchist attack on May Day, 
similar to what happened in 1919 during the bombing campaign.
10
 The nation girded 
itself, with some towns and cities organizing a patriotic “America Day” to counteract the 
socialist activities.
11
 There existed much trepidation towards the coming day, with many 
newspapers fostering the scare tactics.
12
 The holiday passed without incident though, and 
the media began to question the attorney general’s reliability.
13
 Attacks on Palmer 
appeared with frequency in newspapers across the country, with even members of the 
Republican Party attacking him for abuse of power. Republican Senator MacCrate of 
New York stated that “no radical leader had done more to unsettle the nerves of the 
American people than the Attorney General.”
14
 Another decisive piece of evidence came 
out that helped drive the final nail into the coffin of the Red Scare paranoia.  
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On May 30, 1920, a report came out, endorsed by twelve distinguished lawyers, 
entitled To the American People: Report Upon the Illegal Practices of the United States 
Department of Justice. Authored by many pre-eminent scholars including Zechariah 
Chafee Jr. and Felix Frankfurter, this document contained damning evidence against the 
raids conducted by the attorney general, and served as the major blow to ending the 
round-ups and hysteria perpetuated by the American press. The piece received 
publication by the National Popular Government League (NPGL), an organization 
founded in 1913 by Judson King with the aims of progressive-oriented reforms in 
America, with Oklahoma's Senator Owen as an organizer.
15
 Originally created with the 
intent to promote direct democracy, the group eventually stood for protection of civil 
liberties by the time the Palmer Raids started.
16
  
Harkening back to the outrageous actions against radicals in Oklahoma, the 
publication reported numerous incidences that revealed the true extent of Department of 
Justice violations. The opening pages charged the federal office with arrests without 
warrants, depriving the detained their right to habeas corpus, destruction of property, 
provocative agents, compelling subjects to be witnesses against themselves, and abuse 
and mistreatment.
17
 The document went on to detail various instances that showcased the 
wanton disregard for law when federal officials carried out the raids. In one example, it 
told how a group of workers came together to discuss the purchase of an automobile. In 
violation of freedom of assembly, the police raided the meeting and arrested sixty-three 
persons without warrants. Later releasing sixteen, the remaining members were kept in 
squalid conditions with little or no food, and no soft bedding.
18
 Further incidents included 
warrants issued to certain persons, and being held in secret confinement. Later, one 
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person in holding committed suicide by jumping out the window of the Department of 
Justice building.
19
 A sworn statement came from one detainee, whom authorities arrested 
without warrant and beat in the presence of other agents as they tried to get him to furnish 
evidence of his guilt.
20
 In another case, a student, by the name of Nicaoli Melikoff was 
attending class when detectives came into the building. The student recalled how the men 
searched everyone, took the twenty dollars he had, never giving it back, and ordered 
everyone outside the room where they were promptly assaulted by other agents in 
waiting. The attack was particularly severe for Melikoff, who remembered being struck 
repeatedly, held down with a man on his back, and thrown down the stairs.
21
 
Following the release of the Report on Illegal Practices, the enthusiasm in favor 
of punishment for radicals dramatically switched across the country. Instead of blind 
support for the deportation of suspects, new calls were heard throughout the nation 
questioning these crimes.
22
 Congress soon called the attorney general to testify before 
them on the charges made against the Department of Justice.
23
 During the hearing, 
attorney for the prosecution Jackson Ralston stated right off that a majority of the arrests 
had been identified as bogus, and that the Department of Justice forged evidence in many 
of the cases forwarded to the Bureau of Immigration.
24
 Palmer proclaimed his innocence, 
and stated he had simply fought against a wild strain of anarchism that threatened to 
consume the world. He proclaimed the government's inherent right to protect itself, while 
proclaiming the insanity of those rounded up.
25
 The attorney general further complained 
of how the “ultra-radical press” had maligned him, and how they only clung to the 
strictest interpretation of constitutional government when it suited their purposes.
26
 The 
attorney general continued his diatribe against the media, complaining of liberal bias, and 
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 At the close of the hearings, congress cleared Palmer of his charges, though his 
reputation remained dubious at best.
28
 With the discrediting of the attorney general, the 
report released by the NPGL, and the canceling of arrests, the raids effectively ended. 
The First Red Scare hysteria receded into public memory, and the nation attempted to 
carry on a new sense of normalcy it so longed for since the end of the war. Throughout 
the chaos, the major battlegrounds of the First Red Scare occurred primarily near the 
resource rich areas of the country. As battles waged between labor and business over 
control, the US redirected its war-time hysteria and paranoia on its new foe, communism. 
Sensing the radical and foreign influenced elements in unions, the government and public 
surmised that all labor had to be Bolshevist inspired. To that end, the media and 
authorities framed nearly every instance of discontent as a communist plot to overthrow 
the government, turning in what any other year would have been an ordinary labor 
dispute, into a full blown crisis. Oklahoma followed along national trends with its 
reaction to these events. Its distinctness can be seen however, in the unique resources it 
possessed. Without its combination of coal mining and oil production, the First Red Scare 
in Oklahoma would have turned out much differently. Assuredly Oklahoma would have 
succumbed to the Red Scare mentality. But the harsh reactions taken by Robertson appear 
in doubt without the strategic interest in the areas of resources that attracted large 
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Conclusion 
 The events throughout the First Red Scare in Oklahoma demonstrated that 
resources were a key driving force behind labor instability, contributing directly to the 
rampant fear and paranoia in the state and across the nation. Simple labor disputes over 
control of these resources exploded into irrational fears and animosity that propelled 
Oklahomans to react negatively and harshly to any instance of perceived radicalism. The 
preceding chapters illustrated how the state laid the foundation for the Red Scare 
mentality to thrive, showing how poverty, control of resources, unfair labor practices, and 
unions played a part in shaping Oklahoma's experience during this turbulent time. The 
location of resources determined where and how severe the disturbances would be. This 
work also showcases how Drumright and McAlester, the two key events in the state's Red 
Scare, became examples of what the Red Scare was all about, with rampant and illogical 
fear guiding whole groups of people to acts of depravity and hatred towards their fellow 
man. The two events, especially Drumright, thrust Oklahoma into the national spotlight, 
with the state taking center stage for a brief period in time in the unfolding saga of 
paranoia.  
 The state shared much in common with the rest of America. The fear and hatred 
expressed in the state was not unique. All across the country labor disputes, deportations, 
deprivation of rights, violence, and murder occurred in heightened form. Oklahoma 
created its own unique experience, however, based on the resources it contained. The coal 
mining and oil production industries helped shape the state leading up to and during the 
First Red Scare. Without oil, IWW presence in the fertile fields of eastern Oklahoma 
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would have been lessened. The Drumright affair and Tulsa Outrage would have occurred 
very differently, if it all, had it not been for the taint of radicalism left by the Wobblies.  
 The coal fields also played a role. Without mine owners and operators feuding 
over poor conditions and lack of sufficient pay, the nationwide coal strike would not have 
affected Oklahoma in the way that it did. Oklahoma still would have suffered through 
fuel shortages, but the falsely reported threat of foreign miners within the state would not 
have existed. This circumstance directly altered how Oklahomans viewed events during 
the First Red Scare. The anti-foreign xenophobia that existed during World War I 
exploded  during the mining strike and expressed itself in highly disturbing ways. 
Preachers, citizens, schools, and government officials all made disturbing accusations 
against foreigners in the state, with some going so far as to demand deportation and even 
execution of  the supposed radicals.  
 While Drumright and the mining strike represented the zenith of overreaction 
over resources in the state, the Red Scare mentality would continue in Oklahoma and 
across the nation in 1920. Only by the summer of that year, with the discrediting of 
Attorney General Palmer, did the excesses of the witch hunt appear evident. By then the 
damage had been done, and the cause of labor would be dramatically harmed. 
 The coverage of these events have been scarcely covered in Oklahoma 
historiography. While the national portrayal of the First Red Scare is abundantly full of 
various interpretations and authoritative works, no previous comprehensive study 
explored the topic for Oklahoma. Hopefully the preceding chapters fill in this gap, and 
provide a clearer picture of the overall event in the state. By adding a geographic 
viewpoint, that of resources as the key motivator for labor action and disputes that stirred 
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up significant Red Scare panic, this thesis shows how Oklahoma's Red Scare experience 
was shaped by its coal and oil industries.   
 For decades, no single work ever covered the Drumright affair in any significant 
depth, and as this work illustrates, the event thrust Oklahoma into the national discussion 
of the First Red Scare. The state also became a part of larger events as its miners joined 
with the UMW to strike for better working conditions. Mine owners unfairly rejected the 
worker's demands, and Governor Robertson failed as a leader for not considering the 
validity of miner's demands. The two events illustrated how central resources were to the 
struggles during the First Red Scare, and the total fear that consumed the state and nation 
during this turbulent time. Coal and oil played major roles in Oklahoma's outlook, 
crafting a unique experience that stands as a stark warning of overreaction in a time of 
national crisis.  
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